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I. INTRODUCTION
The judiciary is the branch of government "least dangerous to
the political rights of the Constitution," Alexander Hamilton argued
in the 78th Federalist, "because it will be least in capacity to annoy
or injure them. . . . The judiciary . . . has no influence over
either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or
of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution what-
ever." ' This classic conception of the role of the federal courts in
American society no longer accurately describes the power they
exercise. Lower federal courts are assuming an increasing influence
over governmental spending, "the purse" in Hamilton's phrase; they
now consequently direct, at least in part, the wealth of our society;
and they exert their "active resolution," or affirmatively exercise
their power, by means of mandatory injunctions.
The most dramatic examples of this exercise of judicial power
have occurred in the fields of corrections and care of the mentally
ill and mentally retarded, fields in which a substantial portion of
current budgets are now mandated not by legislative choice but by
orders of lower federal courts.2 Finding that existing conditions
violate constitutional standards, federal courts have ordered prisons
throughout the nation to improve markedly their physical facilities.
and their level of services.3 They have ordered such extensive
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1 Tm FEDEn~asr No. 78 (A. Hamilton) at 490 (B. Wright ed. 1961).
2 See text accompanying notes 83-85 infra; see also Note, Implementatiorm
Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 Htxv. L. Rsv. 428 (1977).
3 See cases cited notes 16-17 infra.
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improvements in the level of care provided the mentally ill and
mentally retarded that, in one case, the amount allegedly necessary
to comply with the court's decree equalled sixty percent of the state
budget, excluding school financing.4 Public recognition of the
significant effect these court orders have on the overall allocation of
government funds is increasing; stories in the press point to them
as examples of a shift of power to the federal judiciary at the expense
of local democratic decisionmaking.5
The existence of lower federal court orders seeking to remedy
constitutional violations by controlling, in part, the power of the
purse does not, of course, mean that this exercise of power is legit-
imate. The Supreme Court has not yet reviewed any of the orders
that significantly increase government expenditures for prisons or
mental institutions. More importantly, the increasing activism of'
the lower federal courts in remedying institutional conditions has
been paralleled by the Supreme Court's increasing emphasis on
"the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic
society." G The Supreme Court has made clear that federalism limits
federal interference in state activity, 7 and has required the judiciary
to leave major policy questions to the democratic decisionmaking
process.8 The Court, however, has not yet applied these doctrines to
invalidate a lower federal court order mandating action to remedy
a constitutional violation. Rather, the focus of their application by
the Supreme Court to date has been to restrict the kinds of cases
deemed appropriate for the federal courts to decide. But a principal
reason for the Court's refusal to decide certain kinds of cases is its
fear of the impact that federal judicial remedies could have on the
democratic process. 9 The Court has avoided deciding cases which
would have required the very type of federal judicial intervention
in, and supervision of, local decisionmaking involved in the prison
and mental institution cases. Furthermore, one aspect of local
decisionmaking that has been given special deference by the Supreme
Court is the essential legislative function of raising and allocating
government resources. The Court's reluctance to impose judicial
4 Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1317 (5th Cir. 1974); see cases cited
note 15 infra.
5 See, e.g., Tolchin, Intervention by Courts Arouses Deepening Disputes, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 24, 1977, at 1, col. 2; Who Governs Alabama?, 60 Minutes, Vol. IX,
No. 29 (CBS Television Network, Apr. 17, 1977).
6 Wath v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
7 See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).; Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
8 See text accompanying notes 134-35 infra.
9 See text accompanying notes 118-23 infra.
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standards in matters of the purse has led it to uphold government
decisions seeking to allocate or conserve resources when those de-
cisions were challenged on constitutional grounds.10 The cumula-
tive impact of the Court's attempt to limit the kinds of cases federal
courts should decide and its willingness to defer to legislative dis-
cretion in spending decisions is inconsistent with the assertion of a
wideranging federal judicial power to mandate governmental ex-
penditures as a remedy for constitutional violations.
This is not to say that the Supreme Court itself has never
affirmed a lower court order mandating increased government ex-
penditures. It has done so in cases concerning school desegrega-
tion 11 and access to the courts.'2 But the orders that the Supreme
Court has affirmed have been much more limited than those orders,
as yet unreviewed, affecting prisons and mental institutions. Thus
the reason that the Supreme Court has never set limits on federal
equitable power to command the purse may be that no case yet
decided required it to do so. The Court so far has been able to rely
simply on such delphic propositions as "the nature of the violation
determines the scope of the remedy" 13 and "breadth and flexibility
are inherent in equitable remedies." 14 But when the Court reviews
the increasing efforts of lower federal courts to remedy constitutional
violations by requiring significant additional government expendi-
tures, it will have to decide what limits there are, if any, to the
judicial power of the purse.
This Article will explore the nature of those limits. Part II
will describe the lower federal court decisions that have mandated
increased government expenditures. Part III will examine the
Supreme Court's emphasis on the value of limiting judicial inter-
vention in the democratic decisionmaking process. Part IV will
then describe how the Supreme Court, in light of its emphasis on
judicial restraint, has dealt with lower court orders mandating in-
creased government expenditures in the narrow range of cases in
which the Court has authorized them and with the government's
interest in controlling, and limiting, its own expenditures in other
contexts. Finally, in Part V, I will outline my own suggestions as
to how courts should approach the kinds of cases discussed in Part II
given the restraints on federal courts detailed in Parts III and IV.
IoSee text accompanying notes 308-72 infra.
"1 E.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 97 S. Ct. 2749 (1977).
12 E.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
13Swann v. Charlotte-Mecldenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
14 Id. 15.
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II. MANDATING GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES
A. The Intitution Cases
Federal courts have ordered substantially increased government
expenditures principally in three areas of government activity: in-
stitutions for the mentally ill or mentally retarded, prison systems,
and juvenile detention systems. At present they have ordered at
least eleven states to overhaul their facilities for the mentally ill or
mentally retarded, 5 eleven states ie and local governments in seven
other states 17 to revamp their prison systems, and six states to im-
15Alabama (Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D.
Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, remanded in part, decision reserved in part sub nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974)); Georgia (Burnham v. Depart-
ment of Pub. Health, 503 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1057
(1975)); Louisiana (Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. La. 1977));
Mlassachusetts (Gauthier v. Benson (D. Mass. 1976), reported at 1 MENrAL Dis-
.An=rY L. REP. 122 (1976)); Minnesota (Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487
(D. Minn. 1974), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th
*Cir. 1977)); Mississippi (Doe v. Hudspeth (S.D. Miss. 1977), reported at [19771
11 CrLEANcnousE REv. 160); Nebraska (Horacek v. Exon, 357 F. Supp. 71 (D.
Neb. 1973)); New York (New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v.
-Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), 409 F. Supp. 606 (E.D.N.Y. 1976);
New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752
(E.D.N.Y. 1973)); Ohio (Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Ohio 1974));
Pennsylvania (Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., No. 74-1345 (E.D.
Pa., filed Nov. 30, 1977)); and Tennessee (Saville v. Treadway, 494 F. Supp. 430
<M.D. Tenn. 1974)).
16 Alabama (Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd in part,
remanded in part sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977));
Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, decision
-reserved in part, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948
(1975)); Arkansas (Finney v. Hutto, 410 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. Ark. 1976); Holt v.
Hutto, 363 F. Supp. 194 (El). Ark. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nona.
Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974); Holt v.
Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969), 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970),
aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971)); Delaware (Anderson v. Redman, 429 F. Supp.
1105 (D. Del. 1977)); Florida (Costello v. Wainright, 397 F. Supp. 20 (M.D.
Fla. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 539 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1976) (en bane),
rev'd and remanded, 430 U.S. 325 (1977)); Louisiana (Williams v. Edwards, 547
F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977)); Massachusetts (Bel v. Hall, 392 F. Supp. 274 (D.
Mass. 1975)); Mississippi (Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972),
aff'd, 407 F. Supp. 1117 (N.D. Miss. 1975), 423 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Miss. 1976),
aff'd, 548 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1977)); New Hampshire (Laaman v. Helgemoe,
437 F. Supp. 269 (D.N.H. 1977)); Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 423 F. Supp. 1250
(D.N.H. 1976)); New Yoik (Todaro v. Ward, 431 F. Supp. 1129 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
aff'd, 565 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1977)); Ohio (Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007
(S.D. Ohio 1977)); and Oklahoma (Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402 (E.D.
Okla. 1974), aff'd, 564 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1977)).
17 California (Dillard v. Pitchess, 399 F. Supp. 1225 (C.D. Cal. 1975));
Brennemen v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Cal. 1972)); Georgia (Inmates of
Henry County Jail v. Parham, 430 F. Supp. 304 (N.D. Ga. 1976)); Maryland
(Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972)); Michigan (O'Bryan v.
County of Saginaw, 437 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1977)); Missouri (Ahrens v.
Thomas, 434 F. Supp. '873 (W.D. Mo. 1977)); Goldsby v. Carnes, 365 F. Supp.
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prove their juvenile detention facilities?18 Even some federal prison
facilities are now being challenged in federal court.'9 It is important
to specify at the outset the precise nature of the orders that will be
considered in this Article. The decrees in these cases mandate
massive changes in the operation of an institution and its programs,
changes involving the physical condition of the facility, its staffing,
the quality of its services, or a combination of these items. The
nature and extent of change required by these cases, which I shall
call "institution cases," will become apparent in the following dis-
cussion of several major institution cases. There are a vast number
of other, more routine, cases, however, that involve the federal courts
in ordering much more limited changes in the same kind of institu-
tion. These cases involve rdquiring certain procedures prior to
depriving one detained in the institution of his liberty or property
or ordering the closing of a small portion of a facility on the grounds
that confinement there is cruel or unusual punishment or otherwise
395 (V.D. Mo. 1973)); Nebraska (Moore v. Janing, 427 F. Supp. 567 (D. Neb.
1976)); and Texas (Smith v. Sullivan, 553 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1977)); Taylor v.
Sterrett, 344 F. Supp. 411 (N.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd in part, 499 F.2d 367 (5th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 983 (1975)). In addition, local governments are
under federal court order in at least seven of the eleven states listed in note 16
supra: Arkansas (Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971), 358
F. Supp. 338, 361 F. Supp. 1235 (E.D. Ark. 1973)); Florida (Mitchell v. Untreiner,
421 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Fla. 1976); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835 (M.D.
Fla. 1975), aff'd in part, modified in part, and remanded, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir.
1977)); Louisiana (Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. La. 1972);
Hamilton v. Shiro, 338 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. La. 1970)); Massachusetts (Inmates
of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd, 494
F.2d 1196 (1st Cir. 1974)); Mississippi (Obadde v. MeAdory (S.D. Miss. 1973),
reported at 2 PRIsoN L. REP. 413 (1973)); New York (Detainees of Brooklyn
House of Detention v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1975); Rhem v. Malcolm,
371 F. Supp. 594, 377 F. Supp. 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), afd, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir.
1974), 389 F. Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 527 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1975),
432 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)); and Ohio (Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp.
93, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456
F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972)).
18Indiana (Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972), aff'd, 491
F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974)); Kentucky (Baker v. Hamilton (W.D. Ky. 1972),
reported at [19721 6 CrLaanGHousE R-v. 100)); Mississippi (Morgan v. Sproat,
432 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss. 1977); Patterson v. Hopkins, 350 F. Supp. 676
(N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 640 (5th Cir. 1973)); New York (Pena v.
New York State Div. for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Matarella v.
Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Lollis v. New York State Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 322 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), 328 F. Supp. 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1971));
Rhode Island (Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354
(D.R.I. 1972)); and Texas (Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tex.
1973), 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974), reo'd on other grounds, 535 F.2d 864
<5th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 322 (1977)).
19 See, e.g., Jordan v. Arnold, 408 F. Supp. 869 (M.D. Pa. 1976); United
States ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 406 F. Supp. 1243 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); N.Y. Times,
Jan. 9, 1977, at 28, col. 1.
19-18]
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unconstitutional.20 These other cases share with the institution cases
the fact of federal judicial intervention in, state or federal institu-
tions and may occasionally raise some of, the problems involved in
the institution cases. But they differ so significantly in magnitude
that they should be considered a different category of case altogether.
Compliance with a judicial decree in the more limited cases is an
administrative action that can be accomplished with relative ease.
Compliance with the orders in the institution cases requires action
by the legislature to raise or reallocate funds and, once that is ac-
complished, detailed judicial supervision of the executive's efforts to
implement the changes mandated by the court decree. It is the
judicial requirement of majqr legislative action and the detailed
judicial supervision of executive impl !entation-consequences that
derive from the scope of the changes involved-that characterize the
institution cases considered in this Article.
Wyatt v. Stickney,21 the most widely discussed of the institution
cases, 22 involved two district court orders, one for state mental insti-
tutions and one for an institution for the mentally retarded. The
conditions in those institutions presented classic examples of condi-
tions that "would shock the conscience of any citizen who knew of
them:" 23 dangerous physical facilities, severe overcrowding, inade-
quate staffing, denial of the basic necessities of life to residents, and
even brutality in the treatment of those confined for care.24 Faced
with such a record, the district court held that patients involuntarily
committed to the institutions would be denied their liberty without
due process of law unless the state provided them a realistic oppor-
tunity to be cured or to improve their conditions, and that such an
opportunity would require "(1) a humane psychological and physical
environment, (2) qualified staff in numbers sufficient to administer
adequate treatment and (3) individualized treatment plans." 2 To
effectuate the constitutional rights found to be violated, the court
"enjoined [state officials] from failing to implement fully and with
20 See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Hancock v. Avery,
301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969).
21344 F. Supp. 373, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part,
remanded in part, decision reserved in part sub nori. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
22 See, e.g., Barnett, Treatment Rights of Mentally ll Nursing Home Residents,
126 U. PA. L. REv. 578 (1978); Comment, Wyatt v. Stickney and the Right of
Civilly Committed Mental Patients to Adequate Treatment, 86 HAv. L. REV. 1282
(1973); Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial Decree Ordering
Institutional Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338 (1975).
23 1hem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
24 See Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1310-12 (5th Cir. 1974).
25 344 F. Supp. at 375.
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dispatch" 26 each of thirty-five specific requirements for the institu-
tions housing the mentally ill and forty-nine specific requirements
for the institution serving the mentally retarded. Compliance with
the court's orders required massive budget increases for the institu-
tions in question.27 For example, to ensure a humane physical and
psychological environment, the court ordered that no more than six
persons be confined to one room, that each patient be provided
specified clothing and furnishings, that toilets and showers of suffi-
cient number and meeting detailed specifications be installed, that
day room and dining facilities meet specific size and furniture re-
quirements, and that heating and air conditioning adequate to main-
tain a specific range of temperatures be provided.28 To ensure
adequate staffing, the court established a minimum staffing ratio of
two psychiatrists, twelve registered nurses, ninety-two nurse's aides,
seven social workers, and fifteen food service workers, among others,
for every 250 hospitalized mentally ill patients, and no fewer than
one psychologist, one social worker, one vocational therapist and
one registered nurse, among others, for every sixty mildly retarded
individuals.29 Finally, to ensure equalized treatment or habilitation
plans, the court detailed the contents of such a plan, including speci-
fication of the kind of personnel that must periodically review these
plans and the minimum number of such reviews annually.30 The
district court emphasized that "a failure by defendants to comply
with this decree cannot be justified by a lack of operating funds," 31
but it did not decide what affirmative steps it would take if the
funds were not made available.32 The court did, however, appoint
a seven-member Human Rights Committee for each institution to
oversee compliance with the designated standards.83 In affirming
the district court order, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
noted that compliance with the order would require a substantial
expenditure of state funds but stated that lack of resources was no
excuse for noncompliance with the order.34 Like the district court,
26 Id. 378, 394.
2 7 See Barnett, supra note 22, at 587-88 n.47.
28 344 F. Supp. at 380-82, 403-05.
20 Id. 383-84,406.
30 Id. 384,398.
31 Id. 377.
32 Id. 378.
33 Id. 376, 386, 392, 407. Since Wyatt, the appointment by the federal judici-
ary of committees to supervise the implementation of decrees has been held an
impermissible intrusion on local decisionmaking. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d
283, 288-90 (5th Cir. 1977).
34 503 F.2d at 1315.
19781
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it declined to decide whether the court had authority to appoint a
master to sell state land or to enjoin other nonessential expenditures
in order to provide the necessary resources. 85
The order in Wyatt v. Stickney set a model for other orders
concerning institutions for the mentally ill or mentally retarded,38
but it did not represent the outer limits of the exercise of judicial
power over state expenditures in the mental health field. In New
York State Asociation for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller,
T
the district court issued an order concerning New York's Willow-
brook State School for the Mentally Retarded. Although rejecting
the Wyatt notion of a constitutional right to treatment, the district
court found that Willowbrook residents did have a constitutional
right to protection from harm. The court found that because the
closing of the institution was not a realistic option,38 basic protection
for the residents depended upon increased staffing and improved
physical conditions in the institution itself. The court recognized,
however, that.merely ordering an improved staffing ratio would not
increase the personnel available, because, especially in the case of
physical therapists, the state had been unable to recruit a sufficient
staff at prevailing state wages. The court therefore ordered not only
an increase in staff but a ten per cent increase in wages for physical
therapists, deferring possible wage increases for other personnel until
a compliance report was made.39
In Welsch v. Likins40 the Wyatt model was extended even
further. Welsch concerned a Minnesota institution for the mentally
retarded which, unlike the institutions involved in Wyatt, the state
claimed was as good or better than similar institutions elsewhere in
that area of the country.41 The district court nevertheless found
that the physical plant and its staffing failed to meet constitutional
conditions and ordered substantial improvements. The district
court further held that the mentally retarded residents were consti-
tutionally entitled not only to an improved facility but also to the
least restrictive environment consistent with their needs,42 thus re-
quiring the creation of additional, less restrictive, facilities for their
care. Compliance with such a decree necessitated a substantial
35 Id. 1316-18.
3 6 E.g., Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
37 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
38 357 F. Supp. at 768.
39 Id. 769.
40 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in
part, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977).
41550 F.2d at 1128.
42373 F. Supp. at 502.
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allocation of money, an allocation which the legislature had previ-
ously failed to provide.43 The district court therefore ordered the
state to comply with its decree as if adequate appropriations had
been made, notwithstanding the legislature's failure in fact to make
the appropriations, and enjoined compliance with all Minnesota
constitutional and statutory provisions concerning the raising and
allocating of funds inconsistent with its decree." On appeal, the
Eighth Circuit approved the district court order detailing the sub-
stantive improvements that Minnesota was required to make, but it
vacated the order to spend money as if it had already been appro-
priated, noting that serious questions concerning the judicial power
to issue such an order might be avoided by action in the forthcoming
legislative session.45 The Eighth Circuit made clear, however, that
the district court order must be fully complied with, unless the state
decided to close the institution or release substantial numbers of its
residents."
The cumulative financial impact of the lower federal court
orders involving prisons is likely to exceed even that of the cases
dealing with state institutions for the mentally ill or mentally re-
tarded. Federal judicial review of prison conditions in dozens of
cities and states has clearly demonstrated "[t]he sad and shameful
history of penology in this country." 47 The same problems recur
again and again: delapidated, unsanitary, and understaffed physical
facilities, serious overcrowding, medical and psychiatric services in-
sufficient to provide even minimally adequate care, food lacking in
proper nutrition and prepared in unsanitary conditions, and the
almost total absence of conditions that might serve to rehabilitate,
or at least retard the dehabilitation of, prisoners, such as recreation,
vocational training, or visits with friends and relatives. 4"
Judicial reaction to these conditions has been relatively uni-
form; courts have responded by ordering extensive corrective action,
action necessitating dramatically increased expenditures for the
prison systems. To deal with the physical condition of prisons,
courts have ordered extensive structural improvements, 49 a mini-
43 Id. 497-98 n.7.
44 550 F.2d at 1129.
45 Id. 1132-33.
46 Id.
47 Detainees of Brooklyn House of Detention v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392, 397
(2d Cir. 1975).
.48 See cases cited notes 16-17 supra.
49 See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1303 (5th Cir. 1974); Moore v,
Janing, 427 F. Supp. 567, 571-75 (D. Neb. 1976).
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mum number of square feet to be assigned to each prisoner as living
space,50 an increase in custodial personnel,51 the daily cleaning of the
facility, 2 and, where such efforts would not be sufficient to meet con-
stitutional standards, the closing of an institution and the shifting of
prisoners to another facility.53 To remedy overcrowding, courts
have limited the number of people that can be confined to a
facility54 or to the cells 51 or dormitories 16 of a facility. In fact, one
court ordered the city of Boston to fund a bail appeal project that
had lost its federal and state funds in order :to ensure the release of
inmates from an overcrowded jail.8 7 To ensure minimum physical
and mental health care to prisoners, courts have ordered the im-
provement of hospital facilities to meet stringent requirements 58 (in
at least one case ordering the construction of a new hospital)5 9 the
hiring of physicians, c0 physchiatric personnel,6 1 and other staff, 2 the
provision of specific medical treatment, including periodic physical
exams, 3 and the purchase of new equipment.64 To improve food
service, they have ordered the hiring of a nutritionist or similar
50 See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 334 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd
and remanded sub noa. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977).
51 See, e.g., id. 335.
52 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886, 897-98 (N.D. Fla. 1976);
see also Alb&ti v. Sheriff of Harris County, 406 F. Supp. 649, 676 (S.D. Tex.
1975).
53 See, e.g., Bhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974), 527 F.2d 1041
(2d Cir. 1975).
54 See, e.g., Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1977); Taylor v.
Perini, 413 F. Supp. 189, 194 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp.
1182, 1195 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
55 See, e.g., Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 288 (5th Cir. 1977); Detainees
of Brooklyn House of Detention v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392, 398-99 (2d Cir. 1975);
Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
5 6 See, e.g., Ambrose v. Malcolm, 414 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
57 See Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 518 F.2d 1241 (1st Cir.
1975).
58 See, e.g., Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320, 1330-33 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 876-79
(M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd in part, modified in part, and remanded, 563 F.2d 741
(5th Cir. 1977).
59 See Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549, 550 (E.D. La. 1972).
60 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886, 899 (N.D. Fla. 1976).
61 See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 333 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd
and remanded sub noa. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1977).
2 See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 901 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aft'd,
501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974).
03 See, e.g., Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278, 287 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
aff'd in part, decision -reserved in part, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 948 (1975).
64 See, e.g., Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 204 (8th Cir.
1974).
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expert, the revision of food handling procedures and equipment to
meet restaurant standards,6 5 and the provision of minimal nutri-
tional standards. 6 To ensure an improved environment, they have
ordered specific amounts of recreation, reading material6 7 and op-
portunities for outside visitors 6 8 (including specifications concerning
the physical condition of the visiting area), 9 and the provision of
work assignments, educational opportunities, and vocational
training.70
Not every court, of course, has ordered each of the items listed
above; nor has every court addressed a challenge to all of the types
of conditions described. Nevertheless, the lower federal courts are
in almost uniform agreement concerning the need for wideranging
changes in this country's prison system, changes which will have a
major impact on budgets at every level of government. This
budgetary impact will be marked because the courts have con-
sistently rejected a defense based on the cost of compliance with
their orders, responding that lack of resources is no excuse for failure
to comply."1 Many quote the language of the district court in
65 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886, 900 (N.D. Fla. 1976).
66 See, e.g., Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707, 716 (N.D. Ohio- 1971),
aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
67 See, e.g., Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741, 748-9 (5th Cir. 1977).
68 See, e.g., Bhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, 625-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
69 See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 334 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd
and remanded sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977).
70 See, e.g., Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 423 F. Supp. 1250, 1269-71 (D.N.H. 1976).
But cf. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 291-92 (5th Cir. 1977) (denying
existence of right of rehabilitation).
71 "Lack of funds is not an acceptable excuse for unconstitutional conditions
of incarceration:' Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 201 (8th
Cir. 1974). To the same effect are: Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1315 (5th
Cir. 1974) ("[Tlhe state may not fail to provide treatment [which the court found
to be constitutionally required] for budgetary reasons alone."); Gates v. Collier,
501 F.2d 1291, 1320 (5th Cir. 1974) ("Shortage of funds is not a justification for
continuing to deny citizens their constitutional rights."); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d
571, 580 (8th Cir. 1968) (Blackmun, J.) ("Humane considerations and constitu-
tional requirements are not, in this day, to be measured or limited by dollar con-
siderations."); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1184 (E.D. Ark. 1971)
("Inadequate resources can never be an adequate justification for the state's depriv-
ing any person of his constitutional rights."); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362,
385 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971) ("[Tlhe obligation of
the Respondents [prison officials] to eliminate existing unconstitutionalities does not
depend upon what the Legislature may do."). The Fifth Circuit most clearly
enunciated these sentiments in Gates v. Collier, supra, 501 F.2d at 1319: "Where
state institutions have been operating under unconstitutional conditions and prac-
tices, the defenses of fund shortage and the inability of the district court to order
appropriations by the state legislature, have been rejected by the federal court."
Indeed, Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, supra, reversed a district court judg-
ment that had approved the corrective action taken by the state on the grounds
that the government had been doing the best it could with the resources at its
command. The Fifth Circuit held that inadequate. 505 F.2d at 202.
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Holt v. Sarver: 72
Let there be no mistake in the matter; the obligation of
the Respondents to eliminate existing unconstitutional-
ides does not depend upon what the Legislature may do,
or upon what the Governor may do, or, indeed, upon what
Respondents may actually be able to accomplish. If
Arkansas is going to operate a Penitentiary System, it is
going to have to be a system that is countenanced by the
Constitution of the United States.73
This reasoning reflects both judicial insistence on compliance forth-
with notwithstanding the cost and reliance on the proposition (not
generally advanced in the mental health cases but common in the
prison context) that the courts are not really ordering the spending
of money but rather are merely saying that the state must spend the
money unless it exercises its option to close its prisons.74
Cases challenging juvenile detention systems tend to involve
remedies that combine features both of the mental institution and
prison cases. In Morales v. Turman 75 the district court issued an
order affecting Texas juvenile correctional facilities hardly matched
elsewhere for its sheer comprehensiveness.7 6 To mention but a few
items, the court, as in the mental institution cases, ordered the
closing of two state facilities and the establishment of community
based treatment alternatives,77 the establishment in the remaining
institutions of a staff-to-resident ratio of virtually one-to-one, 78 the
implementation of detailed staffing plans, 79 and the creation of in-
72309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971)
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886, 896 (N.D. Fla. 1976).
73 309 F. Supp. at 385.
74 Compare New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller.
357 F. Supp. 752, 768 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) ("Nor can the court direct the closing of
Willowbrook. . . . 'The State has no realistic option open to it to discontinue its
mental hospitals and training schools forthwith."' [citation omitted]) with Gates v.
Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1320 (5th Cir. 1974) ("But the district court did not re-
quire that the legislature appropriate monies for prison reform;, it simply held, in
keeping with a plethora of precedent on the fund shortage problem, that if the
State chooses to run a prison it must do so without depriving inmates of the rights
guaranteed to them by the federal constitution.") (emphasis in original).
75364 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tex. 1973), 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974,
rev'd on other grounds, 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 322 (1977).
76See 535 F.2d at 868-69. In a later proceeding, the Fifth Circuit criticized
the original district court order as "excessively detailed." Morales v. Turman, 562
F.2d 993, 999 (5th Cir. 1977).
77383 F. Supp. at 125.
78 Id. 126.
79 Id. 102, 105.
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dividualized treatment plans for each juvenile. 80 As in the prison
cases, the court ordered "minimum standards in areas of medical
treatment, social worker care, dietary requirements, educational and
vocational programs, house parents, and correctional officers." 81
Other courts have also ordered wideranging, though less compre-
hensive, action to implement the right to treatment in juvenile de-
tention facilities.
8 2
Estimates of the cost of compliance with the federal court orders
in the institution cases are rare, but the few hints available indicate
that the sum will be substantial. Louisiana, for example, appropri-
ated more than 106 million dollars for capital improvements follow-
ing a court decree concerning the Angola state penitentiary, com-
pared with approximately 1 million dollars annual total capital
outlay previously made for all state correctional facilities. The state
also added more than 18 million dollars of supplementary operating
funds to the prison budget, an amount almost equal to the total
operating budget of the entire state prison system at that time.
83
These additional expenditures did not purport to cover all the addi-
tional costs involved in complying with the court order concerning
the Angola facility, let alone the costs required to meet other federal
court decrees concerning other Louisiana prisons.84 Compliance
with one Alabama prison order has been estimated at more than 28
million dollars compared to the total state corrections budget of
roughly 22 million dollars, and this estimate specifically does not
include the costs of improving medical care in the Alabama prison
system mandated by another federal court order.85 Whether these
figures are representative of the magnitude of increase in state ex-
penditures necessary to comply with the orders in the institution
cases cannot be accurately determined because of the lack of data
80 535 F.2d at 869.
81 Id.
82 See cases cited note 18 supra.
83 See Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1218 (5th Cir. 1977); LAw
ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISThA7TON AND BUREAU OF T=E CENSUS, EXPENDI-
Tu AND EMPLOYMENT DATA FOR THE CRIMINAL JuSTICE SYSTEM 1975, at 272,
276 (1977).
84 See Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1219 n.9 (5th Cir. 1977); Hamil-
ton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. La. 1972); Hamilton v. Schiro, 338
F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. La.-1970).
srA AmXnCA CInVm LmERTiES UNION FOUNDATIN NATIONAL PRISON PRojECr,
THE A.AmBA PRSON SYsrEm: AN ANALYSIS A ESTIMATE OF T COST AND
ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS RESULTING FROM TEE ORDmS IN THE UNEF SrATES
Disomcr CouRT IN Pugh v. Locke AND James v. Wallace, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D.
Ala. 1976), at 6, 23 (1977); LAw ENFORCmmN AssIsrANcE ADwmI-NtBrnAo, AND
BURtEAU OF THE CENSUS, EXPENDITURES AND EMPLOYMENT DATA FOR THE = C NAL
JusTICE SYSTm- 1975, at 271 (1977).
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available; however, even a cursory examination of the extensive
changes involved, both in terms of capital construction and annual
operating costs, suggests that a major reallocation of resources to the
institutions for the mentally ill or mentally retarded, prisons and
juvenile detention centers will be required.
The impact of the institution cases on state budgets is not likely
to be eliminated by a Supreme Court decision that the cases are
wrong as a matter of substantive constitutional law. Whatever the
Supreme Court eventually decides about the existence of a constitu-
tional right to treatment for the mentally ill, of habilitation for the
mentally retarded, or of rehabilitation for prisoners, 6 the Court is
likely to find that involuntary confinement in conditions which are
so degrading and deplorable that they fail to meet certain minimum
standards of decency constitutes a deprivation of liberty without due
process of law. Given the records in a number of the institution
cases, the requisite level of degradation, whatever it may be, exists
in a number of state institutions. I therefore assume for purposes
of this Article that at least some of the conditions condemned by
lower federal courts will be found constitutionally deficient by the
Supreme Court as well when it decides its first institution case.
The impact of the institution cases on the state treasuries is also
not likely to be eliminated by the option suggested by some courts
that the state can avoid spending money by closing the institutions
involved. These institutions cannot be closed. Although specific,
individual facilities might be closed and inmates transferred to other
facilities as has occurred in some states, 7 no responsible government
official could close all prisons and let all inmates go free. Nor could
the government properly discharge all mentally ill patients, includ-
ing those dangerous to themselves or to others. Moreover it would
be tragic if the result of the institution cases would be to close state
facilities and release individuals, such as the mentally retarded, who
have no place to go and no other services available."" Thus, in
practical terms, the states have no choice but to continue to operate
86 The existence of such rights is the subject of extensive academic discussion.
See, e.g., sources cited in Note, supra note 22, at 1339 n.5. Recent doubts about
the existence of these rights have been expressed by the Fifth Circuit. Morales v.
Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 998 (5th Cir. 1977); Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283,
291 (5th Cir. 1977).
8
7 See Bhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974), 527 F.2d 1041 (2d
Cir. 1975). See also N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1976, at 43, col. 1. In addition, Federal
judges prohibited new admissions to Alabama state prisons for 15 months, with the
result that city and county jails held those who otherwise would have been sent
to state facilities. N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1976, at 43, col. 1.
88 See N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1977, at 1, col. 5; see also Barnett, supra note 22.
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-prisons and facilities of some sort for the mentally ill and mentally
-retarded. Some courts recognized this reality s9 and simply framed
.iheir decrees as general orders to improve the institutional condi-
-tions. Although others (ironically, mostly in the prison cases) pur-
-port to give the state the option of closing the institution rather
:than complying,90 surely even these courts must consider the option
illusory. Thus, a court decree detailing what the government must
-do to continue running its prisons or mental institutions is the
functional equivalent of a mandatory injunction that it do those
things.91
Finally, the impact on the state treasury is not likely to be
.easily absorbed by using money allocated to lower priority items
,elsewhere in the budget. That some additional money is likely
to be available is evidenced by the considerable shift of re-
,sources accomplished by some states as they have begun to
,comply with court orders.92  But the money that can be made
.available in this way is limited. In virtually every case the
-government has complained of lack of resources in light of the
magnitude of the ordered action.93 Thus, although the courts insist
.on strict compliance with the decrees, there has in fact been only
partial compliance.04  The financial drain on the states is aggravated
by the fact that the court decrees, envisioning minimum standards
for staffing and operation of the facilities, necessitate providing a
-mandated amount of money to the institutions in every annual state
budget on a permanent basis. Given the financial position of most
89 See note 74 supra.
soId. "[T]here are more men and women in state and Federal prisons today
-than at any other time in the nation's history.... As of fan. 1 [1976], there were
-249,716 persons in prisons around the country, 10 percent more than a year
-earlier." N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1976, at 12, col. 4.
91 The mandatory nature of an injunction is in itself nothing new. See
D. DOBBS, HANDBOOX ON Tm LAw OF BEMEDMIES 105 (1973). The difculty arises
-because it is the state legislature and executive that are mandated to act.
92A number of cases note the existence of partial compliance by the states.
E.g., Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1218 (5th Cir. 1977); Miller v. Carson,
401 F. Supp. 835, 853, 889 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd in part, modified in part, and
remanded, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977). The National Institute of Law Enforce-
ment and Criminal Justice, surveying implementation in a number of cases, con-
,eluded that, while states have not complied with some aspects of court orders, the
-worst abuses have been eliminated. NATioNAL IN5IT=tJTE OF LAw EFoz eE-,caNTr
-,am CmA JusTIcE, L&w ENFoanmer AsssrAr AnsmxsTroN, U.S. DE'T
oF JusTicF, Asrm Dcm oN: IMPLEMNTA TON OF JumIcrAL DEcmms iN Conpc-
-TMoNAL SEaTinss 6, 27-29 (1977). See also Note, supra note 22, at 1379.
93 See, e.g., cases cited in note 71 supra.
- See note 92 supra.
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state and local governments, 95 it is likely that a point short of full
compliance will be reached-after the most outrageous conditions
have been eliminated but with a substantial amount of money re-
quired for further compliance-after which the funds necessary for
full compliance will become extremely difficult to find, if not simply
unavailable. It is then that the confrontation between the federal
judiciary and the states over control of the state treasuries is most
likely to occur.
B. Other Judicial Mandates of Expenditures
Judicial impact on government expenditures has not been con-
fined to the institution cases. Although it has not yet been widely
used for this purpose, the equal protection clause has been inter-
preted by lower federal courts to mandate increased government
expenditures. For example, in Frederick L. v. Thomas 9 6 a federal
district court held that plaintiffs stated a cause of action under the
equal protection clause when they challenged the denial by the
School District of Philadelphia of free public education specially
suited to children with specific learning disabilities. The plaintiffs
contended that children with learning disabilities were effectiviely
excluded from public education by the school district's failure to
provide them anything more than access to the normal curriculum.
If, as the district court suggested, the school district is constitution-
ally required to provide meaningful education to all children once
it provides free education to normal children-and thus must provide
special education for children not able to function in the normal
curriculum-the result is either reallocation of existing funds, dimin-
ishing some services to allow reaching a greater number of indi-
95 In recent years a number of states and cities have been forced to reduce
expenditures because of financial difficulties. New York City provides the most
well-known example, see CONcRESsIoNAL BtD=x OmcE, Nm YoPx Cm s FiscAL
PRoBLEM, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), Jonr EcoNo.ac Comm- ., NEw Yoim Crir's
FINNcrTA CRIsEs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); but it is by no means unusual.
See, e.g., Bradley v. Milliken, 540 F.2d 229, 247-51 (6th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 97
S. Ct. 2749 (1977) (Detroit school system). The fiscal situation varies from state
to state and from city to city, see ADvisoRy COm'N Ox INTERCOVXEMMNTAL
RELATIONS, MEAsuRINc THE FIscAL CAPACITY AN EFFORTs oF STATE AN LOCAL
AREA (1971), and in some areas, depending on the strength of the nation's econ-
omy, the fiscal situation may allow some room for expansion of services. H. OWEN
& C. ScauLTzE, SETrnG NATIONAL PmRonRiEs: TnE NEXT TEN YFARS 387-90,
405-09 (1976). The point at which it will become difficult to locate resources to
meet increased costs will, therefore, depend on local circumstances, but that such a
point exists in every jurisdiction, at some stage, seems beyond dispute.
96 408 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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viduals, or, more likely, an increase in the school budget to finance
additional programs.97
The likelihood of the equal protection clause becoming a
vehicle for mandating increased government spending was dimin-
ished considerably, however, by the Supreme Court in Maher v.
Roe.98 The Maher Court rejected an attempt to invalidate, on
equal protection and due process grounds, a state's refusal to fund
therapeutic abortions in its Medicaid program, and a companion
case rejected a similar challenge to a city's refusal to provide
abortion services in its public hospitals. 99 The Court's conclusion
in Maher was based on the proposition that the failure of the state
to fund access to services does not unconstitutionally impinge on
the right to receive those services, even if that right is so funda-
mental that its exercise cannot be prohibited by the government.
Furthermore, the state is under no obligation to provide resources to
the poor adequate to enable them to obtain services available
privately, even if, realistically, only the rich are able to afford such
services themselves.100  Instead, the Maher Court said, "[o]ur cases
uniformly have accorded the States a wider latitude in choosing
among competing demands for limited public funds." 101
Of course, Maher does not preclude a finding of an equal pro-
tection violation in the denial of public education to the poor or
handicapped. An argument might be advanced that denial of
adequate public education itself raises serious constitutional ques-
tions.10 2 The point here is not to establish the reaches of the equal
97 The case was eventually decided on state statutory grounds. Frederick L.
v. Thomas, 419 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 557 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1977).
The School District of Philadelphia has in fact treated the requirements for new
special education programs as a mandatory budget increase, amounting to 7.1
million dollars for the 1975-76 school year. SCHOOL DisT. OF ImADELPHrA,
SU,&DzJARY OF THE PROPOSED OPERATING BuDGr FOR THE Fiscx.L YEAR BEGINNING
Ju'Ly 1, 1975, at 1 (1975). See also Lebanks v. Spears, 60 F.R.D. 135 (E.D. La.
1973); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania
Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
98 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977).
99 Poelker v. Doe, 97 S. Ct. 2391 (1977).
100 See 97 S. Ct. at 2383.
101 Id. 2385 (footnotes omitted). For further discussion of the implications of
Maher, see text accompanying notes 346-50 infra.
102 Such an argument could be based on San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). While upholding the Texas school financing system
in that case, the Court intimated that a stronger equal protection challenge might
arise if a school system "fails to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire
the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of
full participation in the political process," id. 37, or if the state were to charge
tuition for its public school system, thus absolutely precluding the poor from receiv-
ing an education, id. 25 n.60. The district court in Frederick L. relied on the
first of these concepts in Rodriguez to support its equal protection theory, 408
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protection clause in cases like Frederick L. v. Thomas, but simply
to indicate that at present, in light of the Supreme Court decision
in Maher, the equal protection cases are not likely to have a signif-
icant impact on the public treasury.- If developments should prove
otherwise, then the difficulties of formulating a judicial remedy in
the institution cases would apply in this context as well. 10 3 Because
the institution cases now raise the issue of mandated spending in
its sharpest and least avoidable way, this Article will concentrate
solely on those cases.
III. THE RESTRAINTS ON JUDICIAL POWER
Given the outrageous conditions in many of the prisons and
mental hospitals now under court order, one's initial instinct is to
applaud the intervention of the federal courts seeking to correct
these conditions; the political branches of both federal and state
governments have defaulted in their obligation to do so.' But
F. Supp. at 835, while a three judge district court in Virginia relied on the second
to invalidate Virginia's system of reimbursing part of private tuition for handicapped
children, a system which, the court said, unconstitutionally discriminated against the
poor by precluding those too poor to pay the remainder of the private tuition from
receiving the special education available to those who could afford to pay it. Kruse
v. Campbell, 431 F. Supp. 180 (E.D. Va. 1977), vacated and remanded, 98 S. Ct.
38 (1977). The Supreme Court, however, has never held that the Constitution
imposes an obligation on a school system to provide certain kinds of educational
programs to any of its students, cf. Johnson v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 449
F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1971), vacated and remanded, 409 U.S. 75 (1972) (upholding
constitutionality of statute extending aid to school districts for purchase of books
to be loaned free of charge to students in only certain grades), or that it requires
funding of educational services that are privately available to the rich but which
the poor cannot afford. It has held that the Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970), can properly be read as imposing an obligation
to provide special programs for non-English speaking students. Lau v. Nichols,
414 U.S. 563 (1974).
103 Similar difficulties might arise as well from judicial interpretations of condi-
tions imposed on states and localities as a prerequisite to receiving federal grants-
in-aid. For example, in Stanton v. Bond, 504 F.2d 1246 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 984 (1975), the Seventh Circuit held that the proper judicial
remedy for a state's failure to comply with a congressional requirement of early
childhood health screening as a condition of its participation in the Medicaid pro-
gram was to require the state to implement the program by a certain date. But
each grant statute must be interpreted to see whether Congress intended that
creation of the program, rather than merely the loss of federal funds, should be the
remedy for noncompliance with the grant conditions, and, if it sought to require the
creation of a state program, whether it could do so constitutionally. See Oklahoma
v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 142-44 (1947). Cf. National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding unconstitutional extension
of federal minimum wage legislation to states as employers). For a discussion of
Usery, see text accompanying notes 151-59 infra.
104 Judge Frank Johnson, who has issued a number of important orders in
institution cases, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D.
Ala. 1972), affd in part, remanded in part, decision reserved in part sub nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974), has argued that the respon-
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because it is the courts-federal courts-that are assuming the re-
sponsibility of reforming the way the states carry out some of their
most essential functions, judicial intervention has an effect not only
on the conditions in the institutions but also on the basic allocation
of power in American government. It is this effect that raises the
most serious questions about the orders in the institution cases. To
some, it may seem odd-perhaps conservative is the word-to suggest
that the limits on federal judicial power have any relevance when
the courts are seeking to fashion protection for individual liberties.
But if the courts were to have plenary power to define constitutional
values, command sufficient appropriations to support those values,
and then control by equitable decree the spending of the money
appropriated, they would be exercising all power of government-
judicial, legislative and executive. Such a concentration of power
-was never contemplated by the Constitution. "The concentrating
these in the same hands," said Madison in the Federalist papers,
quoting Jefferson, "is precisely the definition of despotic govern-
ment." 105 The Court may, as it claims, be supreme "in the ex-
position of the law of the Constitution," 101 but there must be some
limit to federal judicial power to commandeer affirmative legislative
and executive power even to enforce its decisions defining consti-
tutional rights. It is not enough to say that it is the legislature, not
the courts, that formally appropriates the money, and that it is the
executive, not the courts, that formally directs its spending, if they
have no choice but to do so in response to a court order. Some
amount of decisionmaking power must be retained by the other
branches of government before they can be compelled to exercise
their affirmative powers. It is therefore necessary to analyze whether
the judiciary in the institution cases has, to any extent, improperly
invaded legislative and executive powers in ordering action to cor-
rect the constitutional violations found to exist.
Our inquiry must begin with the reasons for limiting judicial
power because only if those reasons are applicable would judicial
restraint be required. The Supreme Court has referred to three
interests to be protected by limiting the power of the federal courts:
the democratic process, the federal system, and the proper allocation
sibility in those cases "passed by default to the judiciary." Johnson, Observation:
The Constitution and the Federal District Judge, 54 TEYx L. REv. 903, 915 (1976).
.0 5 THE FRDmrAsr No. 48 (J. Madison) at 345 (B. Wright ed. 1961).
106 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). But see P. BesT, PNocEss or
CONSrITUrONAL DECIsIONmAEG, CASES AND MATEzIAis 67 (1975); G. GCuTmm,
CASES A14D MATEIALS ON CoNsTrrurnoNA. LAw 33 (9th ed. 1975).
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of power within the federal government itself.107 The effect on the
democratic process in the institution cases stems from the fact that
it is the judiciary, and not the politically accountable branches, that
is directing the allocation of government funds. Thus the orders
would be no less intrusive into the normal prerogatives of the legis-
lature in a democratic society if it were state rather than federal
courts issuing the orders as, indeed, is sometimes the case. 08 The
effect on the federal system, on the other hand, occurs because a
branch of the federal government is directing the allocation of state
funds. Thus a conflict with principles of federalism would exist
even if it were Congress, and not the federal courts, issuing the
directions to state officials.10 9 Finally, the effect on the allocation
of power within the federal government occurs, as such, only in
those cases in which the federal courts have ordered action by
another branch of the federal government." 0 Because these interests
differ, they must be examined separately to determine the extent to
which they are affected by lower federal court orders in the insti-
tution cases. An examination of the eleventh amendment will then
follow because, at least until last term,"' that amendment seemed
to determine the balance between the power of federal courts and
the power of the states to control the allocation of money from the
public treasury.
A. The Democratic Process
The anti-democratic nature of any judicial order invalidating
legislative or executive action is well known, the result being that
"the one non-elective and non-removable element in the government
rejects the conclusions as to constitutionality arrived at by the two
elective and removable branches." 112 Yet despite continued ac-
ademic debate concerning the justification for this judicial power,"1 3
it has surely become a lasting part of the American constitutional
system. I do not seek to question it here. Two aspects of the
107 See text accompanying notes 112-94 infra.
108 See, e.g., Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Lucas, 391 Mich. 359, 216 N.W.2d
910 (1974); Jackson v. Hendrick, 457 Pa. 405, 321 A.2d 603 (1974). But see
State v. McCray, 267 Md. 111, 297 A.2d 265 (1972).
109 See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
110 See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1976); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 210 (1962).
11 See Milliken v. Bradley, 97 S. Ct. 2749, 2761-62 (1977).
12 Commager, judicial Review and Democracy, in JU-icrAL. REVMW AND TrE
Sunmxm CoUrT 64 (L. Levy ed. 1967).
113 For a summary of this debate, see W. Loc=AmRT, Y. KAumAI & J. CGopEp,
CoNsTrrtmoNAL LAw: CASES-COMMENTS--QUESTONS 7-30 (4th ed. 1975).
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orders in the institution cases, however, suggest that they are a
greater intrusion into democratic decisionmaking than the normal
invalidation of a law on constitutional grounds. Rather than pre-
venting the government from acting in an unconstitutional way,
these orders mandate affirmative action by the legislative and ex-
ecutive branches to correct a constitutional violation. Moreover,
the court orders involve a subject matter that is the very foundation
of the discretion lodged in the other branches: the raising, alloca-
tion, and spending of government funds.
"Throughout most of our history, the form of the Supreme
Court's contributions to public policy . . . [has been] negative" '14
because a judicial declaration that a statute is unconstitutional
simply prevents the exercise of governmental power." 5  Affirmative
judicial decrees mandating the expenditure of funds in the insti-
tution cases, however, require legislative action either in the form
of reallocation of money from the legislature's priorities to the area
of the courts' concern or the enactment of new taxes. The ex-
ecutive must also act affirmatively to implement the decree once the
money is made available by the legislature, and that implementation
is subject to continuing judicial supervision. The decrees in the
institution cases, by establishing priorities for funding and by detail-
ing how expenditures should be made, thus have the effect of legis-
lation.1 6 The affirmative nature of the order invades the democratic
process not just by invalidating a legislative decision but by replac-
ing that decision with a judicially designed substitute, a substitute
created without "the legitimacy which flows from the process of
democratic self-government." 117
114 A. Cox, THE ROLE oF TnE SuPBiEn CouRT IN AmCA CoviuENm-rN
76 (1976).
"S Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), which launched
judicial power to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional, denied power to the
Court as well as to Congress. By declaring a congressional enactment unconstitu-
tional, it withdrew from the Court a case that Congress wanted it to hear.
116 See generally A. Cox, supra note 114, at 76-98; Chayes, The Role of the
judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HAv. L. REv. 1281, 1296-98 (1976).
"17 A. Cox, supra note 114, at 88. In a recent Article Professor Chayes labelled
litigation such as in the institution cases "public law litigation," Chayes, supra note
116, at 1284, and sought to defend its legitimacy, id. 1313-16. Such a label creates
the impression that this kind of litigation is a normal function of the federal courts,
but the examples Professor Chayes gives are principally of institution cases, de-
segregation cases, and reapportionment cases. As this Article seeks to show, the
authority of the federal courts to issue affimative orders as framed in the institution
cases is by no means clear, and the authority exercised by the Supreme Court in
desegregation and reapportionment cases is narrower than Professor Chayes ac-
knowledges. See text accompanying notes 250-96 infra. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has attempted to limit such a role for federal courts in other areas. See text
accompanying notes 120-48, 220-49 infra. Therefore, although Professor Chayes
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Of course, requiring affirmative action by the political branches
to correct constitutional violations is not unprecedented; the
Supreme Court most notably required such action to desegregate the
schools after Brown v. Board of Education.'8  But, as will be dis-
cussed," 9 no desegregation order approved by the Supreme Court
has been as intrusive into local democratic decisionmaking as the
orders in the institution 'cases. Moreover, the Supreme Court has
made clear that although courts have the power to mandate affirma-
tive action by the political branches, that judicial role is not the
norm in constitutional litigation. Indeed, recent Supreme Court
history has demonstrated the Court's intent to avoid, wherever
possible, such a judicial role. A comparison of United States v.
Richardson 120 with Flast v. Cohen,121 and Warth v. Seldin 122 with
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp.12 3 indicates the Supreme Court's reluctance to mandate action
by the political branches that would entail continuing 'judicial
supervision.
In United States v. Richardson the Court rejected a federal
taxpayer's challenge to the constitutionality of the secrecy of the
Central Intelligence Agency budget, holding that the taxpayer had
not met the strict requirements enumerated in Flast v, Cohen for
bringing a taxpayer suit. The Flast Court had permitted a taxpayer
to challenge a federal statute on the grounds that it provided funds
to religious schools in violation of the establishment clause of the
first amendment. As Justice Powell noted in concurrence in
Richardson, the attempt to distinguish the cases on the technical
sought to take Justice Holmes' advice to focus attention on "'what the courts will
do in fact,' 89 HAnv. L. REv. at 1281-82 (quoting Holmes, The Path of the Law,
10 HAnv. L. Rlv. 457, 461 (1897)), in fact public law litigation is a good deal
less a normal function of the federal courts than Professor Chayes suggests. More-
over, in seeking to defend the expanded role of the courts he denigrates the ability
-of Congress to represent the interests of divergent groups in solving basic problems
("And to retreat to the notion that the legislature itself--Congressl-is in some
mystical way adequately representative of all the interests at stake... is to impose
democratic theory by brute force . . . : Id. 1311), but it is not on an idealized
conception of the legislature's representative character that the legitimacy of legis-
lative action rests. Rather, that legitimacy derives from the Constitution, which
gives the legislature, and no other branch, the power to make the basic policy
,decisions governing the nation's future. See text accompanying notes 137-48 infra;
A. BicxEL, THE LEAsT Dcx-aous BANcr 16-23 (1962).
118347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
110 See text accompanying notes 250-78 infra.
120418 U.S. 166 (1974).
121392 U.S. 83 (1968).
122422 U.S. 490 (1975).
123 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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test of taxpayer standing was unconvincing, 24 but there was another,
more important, distinction between them. Allowing a taxpayer
suit in Richardson would have involved an intrusion in the demo-
cratic process that was not present in Flast. Invalidation of statutes-
albeit state statutes-on establishment clause grounds had become a
familiar role for the Court by the time of Flast.25 Extending the
Court's jurisdiction to the federal statute involved in Flast did not
significantly extend the Court's power, nor did it require continuing
judicial supervision of executive or legislative actions or the inter-
pretation of an unexplored constitutional provision. A decision on
the merits in Richardson, however, would have required the Court
to interpret for the first time the constitutional obligation to pub-
lish from time to time "a regular Statement and Account of the
Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money." 126 Because the
Constitution does not specify who is obligated to publish such a
statement, how much detail it requires, nor how often it must be
issued, allowing a taxpayer to sue in Richardson would mean that
virtually anyone could obtain a judicial decree mandating the
performance, under judicial standards, of the affirmative obligation
of government to disclose its expenditures. This possibility of
numerous judicial orders mandating government disclosure, Justice
Powell argued, would shift power away from a democratic form of
government by substituting judicial pressure for the leverage that
citizens should apply on their elected representatives.1 27 The ma-
jority in Richardson, while relying on a technical interpretation of
standing, also recognized this implication of the Richardson suit:
I]he absence of any particular individual or class to liti-
gate these claims gives support to the argument that the
subject matter is committed to the surveillance of Con-
gress, and ultimately to the political process. Any other
conclusion would mean that the Founding Fathers in-
tended to set up something in the nature of an Athenian
democracy or a New England town meeting to oversee the
conduct of the National Government by means of lawsuits
in federal courts. . . . Slow, cumbersome, and unre-
sponsive though the traditional electoral process may be
thought at times, our system provides for changing mem-
bers of the political branches when dissatisfied citizens con-
124 418 U.S. at 180-85 (Powell, J., concurring).
121 See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
126 U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
127 418 U.S. at 188 (Powell, J., concurring).
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vince a sufficient number of their fellow electors that
elected representatives are delinquent in performing duties
committed to them.1 28
The Supreme Court similarly refused to permit judicial super-
vision of the solution of an intricate political problem in Warth v.
Seldin.129 In Warth the Court held that an attack on the exclu-
sionary zoning practices of a Rochester, New York suburb could not
be brought by individuals residing in the Rochester metropolitan
area who desired to live there or by an organization of builders who
desired to build there, because they lacked standing to sue. In
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp.,8 0 however, the Court found that a developer and its poten-
tial customers did have standing to challenge a suburb's refusal to
rezone property the developers had contracted to improve. Although
the Arlington Heights Court sought to distinguish Warth on the
grounds that the Arlington Heights plaintiffs had shown more of a
stake in the outcome of the litigation than those in Warth,13' a more
convincing distinction lies in the scope of the judicial role en-
visioned in the two cases. In Warth the plaintiffs sought an in-
junction against the suburb's exclusionary zoning practices as a
whole. To grant such relief, the Court would be required to detail
what kinds of zoning practices are constitutionally impermissible.
Then, once it had defined the extent of impermissible exclusion,
future cases would necessitate judicial supervision of the imple-
mentation of even a seemingly permissible zoning statute to ensure
that the unconstitutional exclusion did not occur in its administra-
128 Id. 179.
129422 U.S. 490 (1975).
130429 U.S. 252 (1977).
131 Id. 261-62. Unlike the plaintiffs in Warth, the Court asserted, the builder
in Arlington Heights has shown an injury "likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision.'" Id. 262. But the Arlington Heights builder could not show, any more
than could the Warth plaintiffs, that the inability to build or reside in the suburb
was "the consequence of" the suburb's illegal acts. 422 U.S. at 506. The Arlington
Heights builder had no assurance of the federal financing needed for his project,
429 U.S. at 261, and the Warth plaintiffs had no assurance that the economics ot
the housing market could enable them to move to the suburb. 422 U.S. at 506.
In both cases, a change in the zoning decision might-or might not-result in
plaintiffs having housing in the suburb; the result would depend on resolving
financing problems. In both cases, the adverse zoning decision was but one of
many hurdles that had to be overcome. The Arlington Heights Court found, how-
ever, that its facts, unlike those of Warth, required no "undue speculation." 429
U.S. at 261. In doing so, it relied principally on the fact that the Arlington Heights
litigation was tied to a specific project, id.; but this specificity seems less important
to the detection of a stake in the outcome of the litigation, see 422 U.S. at 527-28
(Brennan, J., dissenting), than to the limiting and narrowing of the type of judicial
decision required on the merits.
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don. Such a decision thus involves judicial supervision of legislative
and executive actions on a massive scale, as the state courts in New
Jersey, where such suits are allowed, have found.132  In Arlington
Heights, on the other hand, the litigation simply sought zoning
approval of a single project. If the alleged racial discrimination in
the city's refusal to permit the project had been proven, the remedy
would simply have been to require the zoning authorities to justify
the rezoning on nonracial grounds or allow the project to be built.
13 3
No federal court supervision of the nation's zoning would be neces-
sary; indeed, no judicial supervision of Arlington Heights's zoning
would be required. Such a suit therefore required only narrowly
circumscribed judicial intervention, allowing the plaintiff a remedy
with little cost in terms of judicial resources.
The essential difference then between Richardson and Flast and
between Warth and Arlington Heights, as the Court itself implied,
13 4
lies in the impact on the democratic process that would result from
judicial intervention into the merits in these cases. Perhaps the
Court should not inject such a consideration into the technical re-
quirements of standing to avoid judicial intervention, 35 but the
important point here is that it did so. Such a consideration is con-
siderably more justifiable when the Court is fashioning the kind of
order an equity court should direct toward the political branches of
government. Richardson and Warth are important because they
demonstrate the importance the Court places on avoiding affirmative
orders that interfere with democratic decisionmaking. The judicial
role currently exercised in the institution cases is surely no less in-
trusive into the democratic process than that which would have
resulted from a decision on the merits in Richardson or Warth, not
only because of the extent of judicial supervision involved, but,
perhaps more significantly, because the institution cases involve the
courts in the allocation of government resources.
The exercise of discretion in matters of taxation and budget
allocation is the quintessential legislative responsibility. Indeed,
representative institutions were brought into existence
• . . by the ability of nobles, clergy, and townsfolk to re-
132 Compare Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Southern Madison, 72
N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977) with Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423
U.S. 808 (1975).
133 429 U.S. at 271 n.21.
'34 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); United States v. Richardson,
418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974).
135 See generally Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Cm. L. REv.
601 (1968).
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sist the royal tax collectors, to assert their right of being
asked for their consent to new or exceptional levies....
This celebrated "power of the purse" has remained one of
the cherished activities of parliamentary bodies
Closely related to this power is the power to determine the
expenditures of the government. In the beginning the two
were joined; Parliament granted specific levies for specific
tasks. Today, the expenditures of the government are,
under a representative scheme, fixed through an annual
budget.'8 6
The Constitution recognizes the critical importance of controlling
the power of raising and allocating money in the most democratic
fashion possible. It requires that "[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue
shall originate in the House of Representatives," 137 the most popu-
lar branch of government, and that "[n]o Money shall be drawn
from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
Law." 138 The reason for vesting in Congress the power both to
raise and allocate money derives from the fact that, even with the
imperfections of Congress, no other body has the institutional capa-
bility of making such decisions. Indeed, the principal protection
for taxpayers from excessive taxation and for recipients of aid from
disproportionately allocated government resources rests on the ac-
countability of the legislature to the public, on its "broad-based
diversity," and on its inability to act without majority support. 39
For this reason, the courts generally do not question legislative de-
cisions on the distribution of tax burdens or the allocation of
revenues among competing needs.140  In fact, the Court has found
the institutional protection for the decision to raise taxes so essential
that it has hinted that any delegation of such a decision even to the
executive branch would raise constitutional problems.141
The orders in the institution cases, of course, do not deal
directly with either the raising or the allocation of money. They
simply require a specified level of services, leaving to the legislature
the necessary revenue raising and allocation decisions that result
from the order. But although the court does not specify the source
136 C. FnIEDIRICE CONSTrTUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMoCRACY 281 (1968).
137 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
138 Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
139 Freedman, Review: Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence, 43
U. Cm. L. REv. 307, 325-26 (1976).
140 Id.; see text accompanying notes 332-40 infra.
141 National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342 (1974);
see Freedman, supra note 139, at 318-29.
[Vol. 126:715
THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE PURSE
of the money needed to comply with its order, it still is engaging in
budget allocation. The selection of each ingredient in the court's
definition of the requirements of due process necessitates either the
elimination of some element in another part of the government's
budget or the raising of additional resources. Because government
resources are limited and because some commitments of those re-
sources cannot be reduced due to contract or other obligations,
142
the impact of a court's decision falls on a relatively few budget items.
The court is in fact allocating the budget away from those items,
probably without even knowing what they are. The court's alloca-
tion decision is simply that every element of the court decree take
precedence over every other competing element in the budget, what-
ever they may be. The legislature retains no say at all about the
comparative value of the item lost to the item required by the court.
Thus the value of legislative decisionmaking on budget allocation
is undermined, to a greater or lesser degree, depending on the size
of the court's demands and the amount of money available.
Some have argued that such judicial intervention in the budget
process in favor of prisoners and the mentally ill can be justified
because those groups are left out of the normal political decision-
making processes. 143 Indeed they often are. But the scarce resources
allocated by government are largely allocated to people indistin-
guishable from those affected by the court orders. The mentally
ill involuntarily committed to an institution may receive additional
services under court order at the expense of those voluntarily com-
mitted to the same institution, or those not committed but using
outpatient facilities at public hospitals or mental health centers.
Prisoners may receive better medical care at the expense of the
parolee who seeks it at a public hospital, or they may receive train-
ing or addiction services at the expense of the public at large who
need identical services. Many beneficiaries of court orders are not
entitled to vote, but neither are the children whose access to educa-
tion, libraries, or welfare benefits might be curtailed to pay for the
court order. The allocation of scarce resources by court order is not
142 Most government expenditures-almost 75% of the federal budget, for exam-
pie-are "uncontrollable" in the sense that they are mandated by existing law or by
a preexisting contractual obligation. B. BLECMIAN, E. GnRumLicc, & R. HAnm,
Sm-ri=i NATmONAL PnromT s: THE 1976 BuDGET 192-93 (1975). Even the use of
the remainder can be changed in the short run only to a limited extent. Id. 197-
207. The difficulties in modifying government contractual obligations were recently
reemphasized by the Supreme Court. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431
U.S. 1 (1977).
143 Chayes, supra note 116, at 1315.
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likely to be from the fortunate to the powerless; it is already the
powerless to whom the state largely directs its resources.
The justification for judicial intervention in favor of the insti-
tutionalized, therefore, is not that they are less politically powerful
but that they are being held involuntarily by the state. The state
cannot constitutionally hold people, the argument runs, without
meeting certain standards because to do so would deny them liberty
without due process of law.144  It need not meet those standards
when providing services to those who voluntarily use them. Indeed,
it can deny those services entirely. Such a division of government
budgets between voluntary and involuntary recipients provides the
basis for constitutional analysis, but, if applied strictly in this era
of limited resources, it would seriously reduce the legislature's
ability to allocate government resources. If the distinction between
voluntary and involuntary should become the basis of resource allo-
cation, the pivotal issue in budget formulation would become the
judicial definition of involuntary commitment. Do children, who
go to school under the threat of truancy laws, attend "voluntarily?"
Are the physically ill, or chronically ill, who are in public hospitals
because no one else will take them, "voluntary" patients? 145 Un-
less the answer to these questions is no, then the budgets of these
institutions, together with those of dearly voluntary services, such
as libraries and higher education, would be subject to reallocation
in favor of those found to be held involuntarily.
By reordering spending priorities in favor of the involuntarily
committed, the orders in the institution cases thus have invaded the
critical legislative responsibility of revenue raising and budget allo-
cation and, because of their detail, the executive responsibility of
managing institutions as well. This shift of power away from elected
officials to individuals appointed for life weakens the democratic
accountability of government and "[i]t is no light thing to do
that." 146 "[G]oherent, stable-and morally supportable-government
is possible only on the basis of consent, and . . . the secret of con-
sent is the sense of common venture fostered by institutions that
144 See, e.g., lihem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 337 (2d Cir. 1974); Donaldson
v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 520 (5th Cir. 1974), aff'd, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
145A proposed congressional bill dealing with the institution cases, see text
accompanying notes 386-89 infra, includes in its definition of institutions subject to
suit on constitutional grounds state facilities for the chronically physically ill or
handicapped and nursing homes. H.R. 2439, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1(5) & (6)
(1977). See also Barnett, supra note 22, at 611-17.
1
4
6J. THiAYn, Johi MABsHALT 107 (1901).
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reflect and represent us and that we can call to account." .14 Some
may be willing to allow, even encourage, federal judges to improve
society regardless of the cost to democracy itself, but the Supreme
Court has made clear that substitution of a judicial decree for the
political process will be tolerated, if at all, only if the judicial in-
trusion into politics is limited to the maximum extent possible. 145
The orders in the institution cases must therefore be framed to
comply with such a limit.
B. Federalism
Orders of federal courts mandating state expenditures in the
institution cases clearly affect the balance of power between the
federal and state governments. Although some amount of federal
power over state activities is envisoned by the Constitution,149 the
Supreme Court has held that the concept of federalism protects state
sovereignty to some degree from federal control.150 The question
in the institution cases is whether the federal courts have exceeded
the limits of permissible federal power and invaded the area of pro-
tected sovereignty.
In National League of Cities v. Usery 151 the Court relied on
the principle of federalism to declare unconstitutional the congres-
sional extension of the Fair Labor Standards Act152 to state and local
government employees, holding the extension beyond the power of
Congress under the commerce clause because it displaced "the States'
freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions." 153 The Court emphasized specifically the
impact of the congressional statute on the ability of the states to
allocate and control their own financial resources. The Court noted
that an extension of the Fair Labor Standards Act would entail
significant mandatory increases in state and local government budg-
ets, resulting in "forced relinquishment of important governmental
activities" 154 to meet the federal statute's requirements and displace-
147 A. BICKEL, THE IEAsr DANGanous BRAwcH 20 (1962) (emphasis in origi-
nal). See generally id. 16-23; A. BicKEL, THE MoRan OF CoNsENT-r 3-30 (1975).
For a similar comment on the Boston school desegregation cases, discussed in note
277 infra, see Lewis, The Boston Schools II, N.Y. Times, May 24, 1976, at 29, col. 5.
148 See text accompanying notes 134-35 supra & 220-307 infra.
149 See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
150 See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
151426 U.S. 833 (1976).
15229 U.S.C. §§201-19 (1970 & Supp. V 1974).
153 426 U.S. at 852.
154 Id. 847.
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ment of "state policies regarding the manner in which they will
structure delivery of those government services which their citizens
require." 155 These combined effects "impair[ed] the States' 'ability
to function effectively within a federal system' "115 and therefore
exceeded congressional power. Usery thus demonstrates that the
concept of federalism shields the allocation and management of state
resources even from indirect congressional control, at least when
Congress is acting under the commerce clause, although the extent
of that protection is by no means elucidated in the Court's opinion.
Many congressional actions have significant state budgetary implica-
tions, yet Usery does not question all such actions.157 But Usery at
least indicates that state management of its financial resources is an
interest subject to some kind of protection by the notion of federal-
ism, the extent of protection depending on the federal interest in-
volved. 58 Usery specifically did not decide the extent of congres-
sional power under the fourteenth amendment to redirect allocation
of state expenditures. 15 9
Although the Court in Usery sought to delineate some substan-
tive areas of state activity protected from congressional control by
the notion of federalism, most of the Supreme Court's applications
of the federalism doctrine limiting federal judicial power have
focused on the form of intervention; these decisions are characterized
by a reluctance to allow federal court interruption or supervision
of local decisionmaking. The principal application of this policy is
the doctrine known as Younger abstention. This doctrine, based on
'5 Id. The Court distinguished Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975),
because the application of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 to the states,
upheld in Fry, did not involve an increase in local budgets or a restriction of state
choices concerning the structure of government operations. 426 U.S. at 853.
156 426 U.S. at 852.
'57 See id. 852-55, distinguishing the federal regulations in question in Fry v.
United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), and United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175
(1936).
158 This was Justice Blackmun's reading of the opinion, id. 856 (concurring
opinion), and his vote was necessary to enable the Court's opinion to command a
majority. See Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YA.E L.J. 1196, 1222-50
(1977). For another reading of the case, see Michelnan, States' Rights and States'
Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86
YALE L. 1165 (1977); Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New
Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HAny. L.
REv. 1065 (1977). Professors Michelman and Tribe suggest that Usery supports a
theory of individual rights against the government for essential services, 86 YAr.
L.J. at 1181-91, 90 HAxv. L. REv. at 1090; if true, the theory would entail massive
federal judicial involvement in matters of the purse. But see Maher v. Roe, 97
S. Ct. 2376 (1977); text accompanying notes 346-50 infra.
159426 U.S. at 852 n.17.
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Younger v. Harris 160 and related cases, 161 denies the federal courts
the power to enjoin ongoing state criminal proceedings, and at least
some ongoing civil proceedings, 1 2 except in the most exceptional
cases. This policy of federal restraint is based in part on the view
that the state judicial proceeding provides an adequate alternative
forum to resolve the issues sought to be litigated in the federal
court. 63 The Younger Court underscored, however,
an even more vital consideration, the notion of "comity,"
that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition
of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union
of separate state governments, and a continuance of the
belief that the National Government will fare best if the
States and their institutions are left free to perform their
separate functions in their separate ways. This, perhaps
for lack of a better and clearer way to describe it, is referred
to by many as "Our Federalism," and one familiar with the
profound debates that ushered our Federal Constitution
into existence is bound to respect those who remain loyal
to the ideals and dreams of "Our Federalism." 164
These two reasons for Younger abstention may both be applicable
to a particular case, such as a federal injunction of a state criminal
proceeding. Because such an injunction would interrupt a state
court proceeding itself likely to be able to resolve the federal issues,
federal intrusion into state government operations is unnecessary and
unwarranted. 65 But the Court in O'Shea v. Littleton 106 and Rizzo
100 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
161 For a discussion of the cases explicating Younger abstention, see Develop-
ments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Haiv. L. REv. 1133, 1274-
1330 (1977). Younger abstention should not be confused with so-called Pullman
abstention, based on Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), which
requires federal courts not to decide a case when there is an unclear issue of state
law the resolution of which might avoid federal constitutional questions. Although
considerations of federalism play a role in Pullman abstention, its primary emphasis
seems to be on avoiding unnecessary federal judicial resolution of constitutional
issues. Thus Pullman abstention does not, unlike Younger abstention, prevent
federal judicial resolution of an issue, but merely postpones it to determine if the
litigation can be decided on narrower grounds. See generally Field, The Abstention
Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 590 (1977); Field, Abstention in Constitutional
Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071
(1974); Developments in the Law, supra, at 1250-64.
162 See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420
U.S. 592 (1975).
163 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971); P. BATOR, D. SHA'mo,
P. MIsnmq & H. WhciasrT.a, HART & WcHsr.En's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSMrI 183 (2d ed. 1977 Supp.).
164 401 U.S. at 44.
165 See Developments in the Law, supra note 161, at 1282-84.
16414 U.S. 488 (1974).
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v. Goode '1, indicated that the Younger emphasis on federalism has
a viability independent of the existence of a state judicial forum to
decide the federal issues alleged.
In O'Shea v. Littleton citizens of Cairo, Illinois alleged a pat-
tern and practice of racial discrimination in the city's administration
of criminal justice, resulting in higher bond requirements and
harsher penalties being set for black activists and their allies. The
Court dismissed the complaint because it did not allege a ripe "case
or controversy" as required for federal court jurisdiction by article
III.161 The Court found no real or immediate threat of injury to
the plaintiffs because none of them would be subject to the alleged
discrimination unless they subjected themselves to the criminal
justice system by violating an unchallenged law. Such an even-
tuality was considered too speculative to justify federal judicial
intervention. The O'Shea Court, however, did not rest simply on
finding the complaint too speculative. As an additional reason for
rejecting the complaint, the Court cited the notions of equity,
comity, and federalism espoused in Younger.16 9 The Court stated
that a remedy for the pattern and practice of abuses in the local
criminal justice system would require "an ongoing federal audit of
state criminal proceedings," 170 a continuous monitoring of the
operation of the state system by the federal courts that would result
in intrusion into the system's daily operations whenever abuses were
alleged. The Court refused to permit such a federal judicial role
in the management of the state criminal justice system. This result
in O'Shea might be interpreted simply to reflect the Court's concern
expressed in Younger that federal courts should not intervene in
ongoing state judicial proceedings. A remedy for the violations
alleged in O'Shea would require such an intervention in the future,
even though there was no ongoing state proceeding at the time of the
O'Shea litigation. Unlike the plaintiffs in Younger, however, the
O'Shea plaintiffs would surely have lacked an adequate remedy at
the state level if their allegations about the local criminal justice
system were true. Thus O'Shea extended Younger by prohibiting
judicial interference with state court proceedings even where those
proceedings could not be expected to resolve the issues sought to be
litigated in the federal courts. 17'
17 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
168 414 U.S. at 493-99.
169 Id. 499.
170 Id. 500.
'71 See id. 510-11 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Developments in the Law, supra
note 161, at 1300.
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Rizzo v. Goode 172 made clear that the Court's federalism con-
cerns expressed in O'Shea protected more than state judicial pro-
ceedings. In Rizzo plaintiffs, who included a class of all black
residents of Philadelphia, sought to remedy what they alleged was a
pattern of police misconduct in that city. The district court, find-
ing such a pattern and practice, issued an injunction requiring the
creation of new methods of dealing with citizen complaints of police
misbehavior, including the adjudication of complaints by "an im-
partial individual or body, insulated so far as practicable from chain
of command pressures." 173 The Supreme Court reversed, citing
O'Shea in expressing doubts whether plaintiffs had adequately al-
leged that they were subject, at the hands of unknown and unnamed
policemen, to a "real and immediate" injury. 74 But, as in O'Shea,
the Court did not simply find the allegations too speculative. The
Court went on to discuss the limits on federal equitable power
attributable to principles of federalism, limiting the district court's
power over executive decisionmaking even though no ongoing state
proceeding could hear the federal claims. The Court rejected the
district judge's notion that federal courts had the power to supervise
the functioning of local police departments.1 7 5 Stressing the govern-
ment's extremely wide latitude in the conduct of its own internal
affairs, the Court observed:
Thus the principles of federalism which play such an im-
portant part in governing the relationship between federal
courts and state governments, though initially expounded
and perhaps entitled to their greatest weight in cases where
it was sought to enjoin a criminal prosecution in progress,
have not been limited either to that situation or indeed to
a criminal proceeding itself. We think these principles
likewise have applicability where injunctive relief is sought,
not against the judicial branch of the state government, but
against those in charge of an executive branch of an agency
of state or local governments such as respondents here.1'7 6
O'Shea and Rizzo thus interpret the principles of federalism
to provide protection for local decisionmaking from federal judicial
supervision, a position similar to the preference for democratic
172 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
173 COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1321 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd sub
nom. Goode v. Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
174 423 U.S. at 371-73.
175 Id. 380.
176 Id.
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resolution of issues expressed in Warth and Richardson. Indeed,
O'Shea and Rizzo provide that protection in its strictest form, sug-
gesting that federalism is an absolute bar to a federal judicial remedy
for the alleged violations. 178 But such a bar to federal judicial power
must be strictly interpreted in light of the established federal judicial
power to provide a remedy for proven state violations of individual
rights.'1  Essential to the results in O'Shea and Rizzo is the fact that
the Court was not forced to confront established fourteenth amend-
ment violations; this was so because the Court found no justiciable
controversy in either case. The fourteenth amendment itself, how-
ever, increases federal power over state activities; 1s3 therefore, cases
like Usery, which limit federal power under the commerce clause,
and O'Shea and Rizzo, which involve no justiciable fourteenth
amendment violations, should not preclude a federal judicial remedy
in cases, such as the institution cases, in which fourteenth amend-
ment violations are established.
The mere existence of a fourteenth amendment violation does
not mean, however, that all restraints on the federal government in
its relations with the states are eliminated. Even in cases of proven
fourteenth amendment violations the Court has made clear that the
form of the remedy, at least, is affected by federalism constraints.' 8 '
If, as Usery suggests,8 2 budget allocation is vital to the continued
independent existence of the states, and if, as O'Shea and Rizzo sug-
gest, 83 continual federal judicial supervision of state performance
of its obligations improperly invades state responsibilities, these
concerns do not simply disappear in a fourteenth amendment con-
text. The principles of federalism are still applicable in cases of
fourteenth amendment violations to ensure that the federal courts
minimize their incursions into the area of state sovereignty. In
177 See text accompanying notes 120-35 supra.
178 423 U.S. at 380; 414 U.S. at 499; see Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist:
A Preliminary View, 90 Hv. L. REv. 293, 320 (1976).
119 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533 (1964); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
180 See cases cited note 379 infra.
181 See, e.g., White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973); Sixty-seventh Minnesota
State Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187 (1972).
182 426 U.S. at 845.
183 In O'Shea the Court found that a continual federal judicial monitoring of
the performance of the local criminal justice system would be required, and that
that would be "unworkable." 414 U.S. at 500. If a police review board had been
established in Rizzo, not only would the department's organization have been
modified by court order, but also the review board's power to enforce any of its
findings would have had to stem from the power that created it-intervention of
the federal district judge. Thus a continual federal judicial supervision of police
conduct and discipline would be required. See 423 U.S. at 380.
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that sense, the principles of federalism must be considered in for-
mulating the remedy in the institution cases.
C. The Allocation of Power Within the Federal Government
The constitutional provision for the separation of powers,
strictly applicable only to the allocation of power among the three
branches of the federal government,"' has been interpreted to re-
strict federal judicial power in a way comparable to the restrictions,
discussed earlier, established in the federal-state context. In Gilligan
v. Morgan 1s5 the Court construed the political question doctrine-
a doctrine that limits judicial power in light of the separation of
powers S6-as a restraint on federal equitable power to oversee the
operations of the political branches of the federal government. In
Gilligan students at Kent State University, in the aftermath of the
1970 confrontation, sought a declaratory judgment and an injunc-
tion against the Ohio National Guard to ensure that its training and
direction did not promote excessive use of force. Although the
Court could readily have dismissed the case on other grounds, 8 7 it
turned instead to the assertion that the complaint raised a political
question. Any relief, the Court stated, would necessitate "continu-
ing surveillance by a federal court over the training, weaponry, and
orders of the [National] Guard, [and] would therefore embrace
critical areas of responsibility vested by the Constitution in the
Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government." 18 Judicial
evaluation of alternative procedures and policies to correct the al-
leged abuses would be beyond judicial competence because such
complex and subtle decisions are matters of discretion, "appropri-
ately vested in branches of the government which are periodically
subject to electoral accountability." 189 NWhile leaving open to
judicial resolution allegations of specific unlawful misconduct by
military personnel, allegations which would narrow and focus the
judicial role in any pending controversy, the Court held that the
suit in its present form raised a nonjusticiable political question.190
18 4 See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 351 (1976); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 210 (1962).
185 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
186 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
187 Four Justices considered the case moot, 413 U.S. at 12; the suit might also
have been dismissed as "speculative" under the doctrine of ripeness as espoused in
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), and Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
188 413 U.S. at 7.
189 id. 10.
19o Id. 11-12.
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To date only a few institution cases involve federal judicial
mandates of improvements in federal facilities,191 but any extensive
judicial attempt to mandate executive or legislative action to im-
prove federal operations would, like Gilligan, involve the courts in
supervision of matters vested in the discretion of the political
branches of government and thus would raise questions about the
limits on judicial power inherent in the separation of powers. In-
deed, the limits on the role of the judiciary are perhaps most clearly
understood in the federal context; judicial power to require that
Congress exercise its power to draw money from the Treasury1 92 or
that the President "take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted" 193 in a manner prescribed by a court order seems clearly
circumscribed by the independent discretion given the other
branches of government in the exercise of their constitutional
powers. Thus, arguments for expansion of federal judicial power
usually stop short of supporting judicial incursion into the power
of the coordinate branches of the federal government. 94
D. The Eleventh Amendment
The eleventh amendment,195 hurriedly passed to overturn the
Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia'196 that a state
could be held liable for its debt in federal court, reaffirmed that the
immunity of states from private suits, absent the states' consent,
applied to suits against the states in federal court.1 97 This doctrine
of sovereign immunity has been invoked principally to restrict fed-
eral judicial power in the Chisholm context-the assertion of private
191 See cases cited note 19 supra.
192 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
193 Id. art. II, §3.
194 For example, the federal government is excluded from the proposed legis-
lation dealing with the institution cases. See note 386 infra & accompanying text.
195 "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
U.S. CoNsT., amend. XI.
1962 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
197The eleventh amendment has been interpreted as a clarification of the intent
of article III of the Constitution, see Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litiga-
tion, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About
Federalism, 89 HAnv. L. RPzv. 682, 684-85 (1976). Accordingly, notwithstanding
the fact that the eleventh amendment itself is restricted to suits against a state by
citizens of other or foreign states, the Court has held that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity protects a state against suits in federal court by its own citizens as well.
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). The doctrine also serves to protect the
federal government against unconsented suits in federal court. See generally
P. BATOR, D. SnApmRo, P. Mxsmrua & W. WEcnsE, HAarT & WECHsL1 'S THE
FEDEiAL CouNTs AD THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1339-51 (2d ed. 1973).
[Vol. 126:715
THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE PURSE
claims against the public treasury.10 8 It might, therefore, seem rele-
vant to determination of the extent of federal judicial power to
mandate state expenses in institution cases brought by private indi-
viduals. Last term, however, the Supreme Court in Milliken v.
Bradley 199 rejected a state's eleventh amendment defense to a direct
federal court order to appropriate money for a specified purpose.
An understanding of the decision in Milliken requires an
understanding of eleventh amendment precedent. Because the
eleventh amendment denies all federal judicial power to redress
private claims against the states, the Court recognized early that a
broad reading of the amendment would severely restrict federal
judicial power to protect individual rights against government
wrongdoing. It therefore adopted the fiction that an action against
a government official is not an action against the state and therefore
is not barred by sovereign immunity.200 Accordingly, the Court
reasoned in Ex parte Young 20 . that an attempt to restrain an in-
dividual government officer from acting pursuant to an unconstitu-
tional statute was a restraint only on the officer, and not the state,
and thus not prohibited by the eleventh amendment. But as the
Court had earlier recognized,20 2 if any suit were allowed as long as
the named defendant was a government official rather than the state,
the doctrine of sovereign immunity would be destroyed altogether.
The Court therefore has attempted to delineate when a suit nomi-
nally against a government official is really against the state and thus
barred by the eleventh amendment, and when it is, both nominally
and in fact, against the official only and thus allowable.
This delineation has not been easy. On the one hand, the
Court has held that a private action for damages, when the money
judgment would be in fact paid by the state, remains barred by
sovereign immunity even if nominally brought against a government
official.2 03 Similarly, the leading case of Edelman v. Jordan 204 held
that the eleventh amendment barred a suit in equity seeking to re-
cover retroactively social security benefits that the state wrongfully
withheld from the plaintiffs because the payments would in fact
198 See Tribe, supra note 197, at 686-88.
199 97 S. Ct. 2749, 2761-62 (1977).
2 0 0 See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 857
(1824). See generally C. JAcoBs, THE ELEVmiH AMm mmNT AND SovEBmEIG
IhimTy 99-105 (1972).
201209 U.S. 123 (1908).
202 Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110 (1828); see
C. JACOBS, supra note 200, at 102-03.
203 Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945).
204 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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come from the state's general resources. On the other hand, the
Edelman Court recognized that not every suit with an impact on
the public treasury would be barred by the eleventh amendment:
As in most areas of the law, the difference between the
type of relief barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that
permitted under Ex parte Young will not in many instances
be that between day and night. The injunction issued in
Ex parte Young was not totally without effect on the State's
revenues, since the state law which the Attorney General
was enjoined from enforcing provided substantial monetary
penalties against railroads which did not conform to its pro-
visions. Later cases from this Court have authorized
equitable relief which has probably had greater impact on
state treasuries than did that awarded in Ex parte Young.
. . . But the fiscal consequences to state treasuries in these
cases were the necessary result of compliance with decrees
which by their terms were prospective in nature. State
officials, in order to shape their official conduct to the man-
date of the Court's decrees, would more likely have to
spend money from the state treasury than if they had been
left free to pursue their previous course of conduct. Such
an ancillary effect on the state treasury is a permissible and
often an inevitable consequence of the principle an-
nounced in Ex parte Young, supra.
20 5
Milliken v. Bradley 206 required interpretation of this quotation
from Edelman. In Milliken a federal district court ordered Mich-
igan to appropriate money to support specified programs for
remedial education to remedy its unconstitutional segregation of the
Detroit public schools. Critical to the eleventh amendment issue
in Milliken was whether the Edelman Court had meant to suggest
that "ancillary," "inevitable" effects on the public treasury would
not be barred by the eleventh amendment while a direct order
against the treasury would be barred, or, alternatively, that a
prospective order would not be barred, no matter what the effect on
the public treasury, but a retroactive order, like that in Edelman,
would violate the eleventh amendment. The Court in Milliken
unanimously adopted the latter, prospective-retroactive, reading of
Edelman, thus upholding the district court order to pay for remedial
education because it was prospective in nature, despite its "direct
and substantial impact on the state treasury." 207 Because they too
205 Id. 667-68.
20697 S. Ct. 2749 (1977).
207 Id. 2762.
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are prospective, the orders in the institution cases would therefore
also not be barred by the eleventh amendment under Milliken.
If the Court in Milliken had accepted instead the direct-
ancillary distinction of Edelman, it would have invalidated the
federal court order in that case on eleventh amendment grounds;
presumably the orders in the institution cases would be equally
invalid. In fact, the Milliken Court's reliance on the distinction
between prospective and retroactive orders is largely unreasoned,
20 8
and it is considerably less plausible than reliance on the distinction
between "ancillary" and "direct" orders against the public treasury.
If the essential issue under the eleventh amendment is whether the
suit is "really" against a government official or against the state, it
is hard to see why the prospective or retroactive effect on the public
treasury is relevant. If the affirmative decree requires not the de-
fendant official but the state itself, including the legislature, to
appropriate money, it appears to be a suit against the state whether
the money is to be paid for future or past claims. It is, of course,
tenuous to suggest that even a negative order against a government
official does not restrain the state itself, but the fiction that the suit
is against the official alone loses all credibility if affirmative action
by the state itself is required to comply with the court order. On
the other hand, if only the official is restrained and no affirmative
action by the state is mandated, an "ancillary," incidental impact on
the state treasury might not turn the suit into one against the state
itself. The very concept of an "ancillary" effect implies that the
state is not directly involved in the suit. Indeed, unlike the Court's
reliance on the prospective-retroactive distinction, an eleventh
amendment distinction based on whether there is an affirmative
mandate on the public treasury, rather than merely an incidental
monetary effect, is supported both by prior eleventh amendment
208 Although the Court emphasizes the prospective nature of the relief sought,
id. 2762, nn.21 & 22, it does not say why that prospectivity matters. It does say
that the Milliken relief, unlike that of Edelman, could not "wipe the slate clean by
one bold stroke," id. 2762, and did not involve a raid by individual citizens for an
accrued monetary liability. Id. 2762 n.22. These explanations may be no more
than reformulations of the distinction between prospective and retroactive relief,
but they could provide a rationale for that distinction as well. A retroactive judg-
ment might be seen as requiring immediate payment from limited funds-in "one
bold stroke"---while prospective relief might allow compliance over time depending
on fiscal constraints. ("[Tihe injunction entered here could not instantaneously
restore the victims of unlawful conduct to their rightful condition." Id. 2762 n.21.)
A similar implication could be drawn from Edelman itself. 415 U.S. at 666 n.11.
Alternatively, the Court could be emphasizing that no private payments to indi-
viduals would result from a Milliken decree, although the relevance of whether the
recipient of the money is an individual or local institution is by no means clear.
In both Milliken and Edelman the state treasury is forced to disburse money because
of a private suit.
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precedent 209 and by the reasons for the adoption of the eleventh
amendment itself.
210
20 9 The impermissibility of affirmative decrees was originally enunciated in
Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1883). Louisiana had passed a statute in 1874
issuing bonds and promising their payment in the most extravagant terms, including
an assurance of the imposition of a special tax without further legislative authoriza-
tion if necessary for payment, as well as a declaration that diversion by a state
official of those tax revenues to a purpose other than payment to the bonds was a
felony. Id. 713. Although this obligation could not be impaired by the state
without violating the contract clause of the Constitution, id. 719-20, in 1879,
Louisiana sought to stop further levy of the promised tax. The bondholders then
sued to declare the 1879 statute a violation of the contract clause, but the Jumel
Court held the action barred by the eleventh amendment. Although the relief was
phrased as an injunction against enforcement of the 1879 statute, the Jumel Court
reasoned that its real nature was an affimative order on the state:
The relief asked will require the officers against whom the process is
issued to act contrary to the positive orders of the supreme political power
of the State, whose creatures they are, and to which they are ultimately
responsible in law for what they do. They must use the public money in
the treasury and under their official control in one way, when the supreme
power has directed them to use it in another, and they must raise more
money by taxation when the same power has declared that it shall not be
done.
Id. 721.
The remedy sought thus implied power in the federal courts to control the payment
of money not by the normal damage action but by "assuming the control of the
administration of the fiscal affairs of the State to the extent that may be necessary
to accomplish the end in view." Id. 722. Such a replacement of judicial for
political control of state finances was held barred by the eleventh amendment.
lumel was followed by several cases that similarly barred affirmative relief against
the state, see C. JAcoBs, supra note 200, at 122-30, culminating in a proposed
eleventh amendment test enunciated in Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1
(1891):
The dividing line between the cases to which we have referred
[allowing the suit as one against an individual officer] and the class of cases
in which it has been held that the State is a party defendant, and, there-
fore, not suable, by virtue of the inhibition contained in the Eleventh
Amendment to the Constitution, was adverted to in Cunningham v. Macon
& Brunswick Railroad, where it was said, referring to the case of Davis v.
Gray, supra: "Nor was there in that case any affirmative relief granted by
ordering the governor and land commissioner to perform any act towards
perfecting, the title of the company." 109 U.S. 453, 454. Ths holding,
by implication, at least, that affirmative relief would not be granted against
a State officer, by ordering him to do and perform acts forbidden by the
law of his State, even though such law might be unconstitutional.
Id. 16 (emphasis in original).
These cases have not been overruled, and have moreover been followed in cases
dealing with federal sovereign immunity, see, e.g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Com. Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 691 n.11, 703-04 (1949), unless, of course, Milliken
itself overrules them.
21 oAnti-Federalists, of course, supported the amendment as a protection for
the states from unwarranted federal interference. C. JAcoBs, supra note 200, at 71.
But the Federalists supported it too, because they recognized the impracticality of
relying on judicial remedies as a means of strengthening national control of the
states. Even Alexander Hamilton had stated prior to the adoption of the Consti-
tution itself that the states could not be sued without their consent, arguing:
To what purpose would it be to authorize suits against States for the
debts they owe? How could recoveries be enforced? It is evident, it
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Despite the weakness of the Milliken decision in its eleventh
amendment analysis, the result of the case makes a good deal of
sense, not only for that case but for the institution cases as well.
The difficulty with relying on the eleventh amendment to bar direct
federal court mandates on the state treasury is that eleventh amend-
ment prohibitions are absolute, denying federal power to provide
the remedy under any circumstances. Such rigidity is a hindrance
to adjusting the balance of federal-state power in constitutional
cases. In Milliken, for example, the intrusion into state sovereignty
by the direct orders was minor because only a trivial amount of
money was involved,211 while the need for that intrusion to protect
federal rights was substantial.212 Because the state had, in fact,
already agreed to fund desegregation projects costing considerably
more than the ones being litigated,213 to deny any federal judicial
flexibility to provide the necessary additional remedy would have
protected state sovereignty solely as a matter of principle, without
any compelling need to do so. Moreover, because the distinction
between direct and ancillary effects is by no means self-defining, and
because the financial impact of the two kinds of orders may often be
equivalent, a flat prohibition of direct orders requiring the states to
spend money would simply engender judicial ingenuity to accom-
plish the desired result in an indirect way. Indeed, many existing
court orders framed in negative terms in reality have an affirmative
impact on the public treasury, yet are not barred by the eleventh
amendment because they are not mandatory in form.2 14 It would be
could not be done without waging war against the contracting State; and
to ascribe to the federal courts, by mere implication, and in destruction of
a pre~xisting right of the State Governments, a power which would involve
such a consequence, would be altogether forced and unwarrantable.
ThE FEDERAS No. 81 at 511-12 (B. Wright ed. 1961). These difficulties of
enforcement exist only if a federal court orders the state itself to act in a certain
way. It is the direct order, followed by state resistance, that has "the makings of
a constitutional crisis." Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign
Immunity, 77 HAav. L. REv. 1, 26 (1963).
211 he cost, 5.8 million dollars, 97 S. Ct. at 2764, was 0.25% of Michigan's
expenditures for education in 1974. See CouNcir OF STATE Govru ,nrs, Boor
oF THE STATES 260-61 (1976-77).
212 As the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted, the effects of the
Supreme Court's first decision in the case, Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974),
foreclosing an interdistrict remedy to desegregate the Detroit school system, made
elimination of unconstitutional segregation "extremely difficult (if not impossible)."
Bradley v. Milliken, 540 F.2d 229, 236 (6th Cir. 1976). If the Supreme Court
had disapproved the remedial education decree in its second decision, there would
have been no apparent remedy for the unconstitutional segregation.
213 97 S. Ct. at 2755 n.11, 2765.
214 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969). But see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974)
(disapproving retroactive payments made in Shapiro, supra).
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more sensible to distinguish permissible orders by the extent of their
financial burden or their otherwise intrusive nature rather than on
the basis of their form, but eleventh amendment analysis does not
permit the courts to do so. Finally, deciding the permissibility of
federal court mandates of government expenditures on eleventh
amendment grounds would require the acceptance in that context
of all of eleventh amendment law, with quite undesirable conse-
quences. For example, the Court decided as early as 1890 that
eleventh amendment protection does not extend to political sub-
divisions of the state, such as cities and counties. 215 Thus, strictly as
as eleventh amendment matter, federal courts could order any type
of affirmative relief against the major cities of this country, even if
such relief against the states themselves were barred. Yet in Milli-
ken the financial impact of the court order on Detroit was con-
siderably more serious than the impact on the state.216 Although
one might be tempted to argue against the continued viability of
this extraordinary anomaly of eleventh amendment law,217 the rule
was unanimously reaffirmed only last term.21
8
Although the retroactive-prospective test affirmed in Milliken
allows the orders in the institution cases to withstand eleventh
amendment attack, it does not, by itself, render those orders per-
missible without further analysis. The eleventh amendment is only
one bar to a federal court mandate of state expenditures. As dis-
cussed above, any such mandate will affect several important in-
terests-federalism, the democratic process, and, in some cases, the
allocation of power within the federal system. In its own decisions
affecting the public treasury, the Supreme Court has recognized the
215 See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890).
216 Bradley v. Milliken, 540 F.2d 229, 247-50 (6th Cir. 1976). Apparently
the city decided to absorb its portion of the increase to receive state aid. 97 S. Ct.
at 2766 n.3.
217 State involvement in local government finances was virtually nonexistent in
1890, whereas today the nationwide total of revenue raised by local governments is
augmented 62% by state aid. 2 ADvIsoRY CoMm'N oN 1NhROVERNMENTAL -ELA-
VIONS, SGNIFCANT FEATUREs OF FiscAL. FE=EBAIsm 1976-77, at 58 (1977). Thus
any fiscal impact on local treasuries inevitably has a corresponding impact on state
treasuries. Moreover, federalism's protections apply to cities as well as states, as
the Court made clear in National League of Cities v. Usery:
As the denomination "political subdivision" implies, the local governmental
units which Congress sought to bring within the Act derive their authority
and power from their respective States. Interference with integral gov-
ernmental services provided by such subordinate arms of a state govern-
ment is therefore beyond the reach of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause just as if such services were provided by the State itself.
426 U.S. 833, 855-56 n.20 (1976).
218 Mt. Healthy School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 97 S. Ct. 568, 572 (1977).
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need for carefully tailoring federal judicial orders in light of these
interests.2 19 It is the Supreme Court's emphasis on judicial restraint
in fashioning equitable remedies to which this Article now turns.
IV. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT AND THE INSTITUTION CASES
The Supreme Court has upheld federal judicial power to place
additional financial burdens on government, particularly in cases
dealing with the rights of criminal defendants and in those ordering
desegregation of public schools. It has also upheld other significant
federal court orders requiring, or making unavoidable, affirmative
legislative or executive action, most notably in the school cases and
in the reapportionment cases. In doing so, however, the Court has
been much more solicitous of the interests identified in Part III
than have the lower federal courts in the institution cases. As a
result, no federal court order approved by the Supreme Court has
been as intrusive in local democratic decisionmaking as the orders
in those cases. Part A of this section is designed to substantiate
these assertions by comparing the Supreme Court cases, including
its two institution cases, with the lower court orders in the institu-
tion cases. Part B will then document the Court's increasing recog-
nition of the legitimacy of the state interest in avoiding increases in
its expenditures even when attacked on constitutional grounds.
These two sections will provide the basis for the proposed modifica-
tions of the lower court orders in the institution cases presented
in Part V.
A. Government Action Mandated by the Supreme Court
1. Access to the Courts
The Supreme Court's first expansion of judicial power to in-
clude mandating increases in government expenditures occurred in
1956 in Griffin v. Illinois.220 Indigent criminal defendants asserted
in Griffin that Illinois' failure to provide them with transcripts of
their trial, which were necessary for an effective appeal of convic-
tion, violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that
"[d]estitute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate re-
view as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts." 221
219 For a discussion of these factors in Milliken, see text accompanying notes
272-76 infra.
220351 U.S. 12 (1956).
221 Id. 19.
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No legislative enactment was struck down in Griffin. No statute
provided transcripts for the rich but not the poor; the rich paid for
the transcripts themselves. The crux of the constitutional violation
was not illegitimate state action but state inaction. Because it was
the absence of an adequate government subsidy for transcripts that
was declared unconstitutional, 222 the only possible remedy for the
constitutional violation was the creation by the state of a program
making such transcripts available to indigents. This the state did,
at an annual cost of $250,000.223
That this affirmative duty on the state arose for the first time in
the Supreme Court's landmark case concerning constitutional pro-
tection for the poor is not surprising. To the extent that the con-
stitutional protection of the poor is based on a notion that the state
has a duty to protect the poor against certain hazards in an unequal
society,224 such as the hazard of not being able effectively to prose-
cute an appeal, the state can protect the poor only by spending
money. Thus when the Court in 1963, in Douglas v. California,225
extended its protection of the poor to require the furnishing of
counsel on appeal, the effect of the Court's ruling was again to man-
date an increase in government budgets across the country for
indigent defense.
Most cases concerning wealth discrimination, however, do not
mandate increased government expenditures for the protection of
the poor.226 Instead, the most common constitutional protection for
indigents is the invalidation of governmental charges for certain of
its functions, such as poll taxes 227 or filing fees.228 Such a restriction
222 Illinois provided free transcripts only in capital cases and in cases raising
constitutional questions. The Court in Griffin held that they were required in other
cases as well. Id. 14-15.
223 Allen, Griffin v. Illinois: Antecedents and Aftermath, 25 U. Cm. L. REv.
151, 161 n.38 (1957).
224 See Michelman, The Supreme Court 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting
the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 lAnv. L. Rlv. 7, 9 (1969);
Tribe, supra note 158.
225372 U.S. 353 (1963); cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(sixth amendment requires provision of counsel at trial).
226 For example, Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971), held unconstitutional a
Texas provision limiting punishment of certain offenses to a payment of a fine for
those able to pay it, but converting the fine to imprisonment for those unable to
pay. The Court held that the scheme unconstitutionally discriminated against the
poor, but it did not increase the state's financial obligations. Indeed, imprisonment
of an indigent for nonpayment of fines "saddles the State with the cost of feeding
and housing him for the period of his imprisonment." Id. 399.
227 See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
228 See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (divorce action); Smith
v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (post-conviction criminal proceedings); Burns v.
Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (criminal appeals).
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on the government's choice of methods of funding its programs,
which also occurs, for example, whenever a state tax is invalidated
as a burden on interstate commerce, 29 has a significantly less exten-
sive impact on legislative and executive discretion than requiring an
increase in specific items in the government budget. The govern-
ment may have to reallocate the burden of paying for its programs,
but there is no judicial mandate of legislative or executive action.
An invalidation of a method of raising revenue is simply a tradi-
tional judicial declaration of invalidity, involving only a negative
restraint on otherwise unchecked legislative discretion.230  Of all the
cases involving protection of the indigent, only two lines of cases
impose an affirmative requirement of legislative action: those follow-
ing Griffin requiring subsidization of transcripts or their equiva-
lent 231 and those following Douglas requiring provision of counsel
or its equivalent.232 In light of their affirmative impact, the Supreme
Court has carefully limited the intervention in local decisionmaking
permitted in these two kinds of cases.
Griffin and Douglas were unusual in requiring additional funds
for specific aspects of providing an adequate criminal defense, but
they involved only a moderate step beyond the general concept that
the states are obligated to provide a fair trial, whatever the cost, or
face reversal by the Supreme Court.233 Indeed, Griffin and Douglas
did not sanction a mandatory federal injunction requiring state
action, but simply reversed state court decisions interpreting con-
stitutional requirements for criminal appeals. Like other reversals
of state judgments that may cause increased local expenditures, such
as routine reversals of criminal convictions, they involved no direct
order of legislative or executive action. The Court in Griffin recog-
nized the implied mandatory impact of its order, but merely stated
that "[w]e are confident that the State will provide corrective rules
229 See generally P. FnxMND, A. SurHEr_ AND, M. HOWE & E. BROWN, CONSTI-
TTrTONAL LAW: CASES AND OTHER PROBLEMS 479-602 (1977); Developments in
the Lat,-Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 Hnv.
L. BEv. 953 (1962).
230 See text accompanying notes 114-17 supra.
231 E.g., Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971); Roberts v. LaVallee,
389 U.S. 40 (1967); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963). But see United
States v. MaeCollom, 426 U.S. 317 (1976) (free transcripts not required in federal
habeas corpus proceedings); Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971) (state
provided transcript substitute adequate).
232E.g., Bounds v. Smith, 97 S. Ct. 1491 (1977) (law library for prison
inmates). But see Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (counsel not required on
discretionary appeals).
233 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
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... .234 The lack of confrontation with state authorities was
underscored by the Court's emphasis on the considerable legislative
flexibility in formulating the necessary corrective action. The Court
specifically did not require transcripts to be purchased in every case
involving an indigent defendant; it allowed the states to find other
means of providing adequate and effective appellate review.
23 5
The Court's emphasis on local flexibility was detailed further
in Draper v. Washington.236 Methods of helping indigents prepare
an appeal other than providing a transcript would be acceptable,
the Court indicated,
if they place before the appellate court an equivalent re-
port of the events at trial from which the appellant's con-
tentions arise. A statement of facts agreed to by both sides,
a full narrative statement based perhaps on the trial judge's
minutes taken during trial or on the court reporter's un-
transcribed notes, or a bystander's bill of exceptions might
all be adequate substitutes, equally as good as a transcript.
Moreover, part or all of the stenographic transcript in cer-
tain cases will not be germane to consideration of the ap-
peal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds
unnecessarily in such circumstances. . . [T]he fact that
an appellant with funds may choose to waste his money by
unnecessarily including in the record all of the transcript
does not mean that the State must waste its funds by pro-
viding what is unnecessary for adequate appellate review.
23a
Similarly, although Douglas required counsel on appeal, it did not
prevent the states from limiting expenses by relying, to the extent
possible, on volunteer attorneys.23 8  The Court has further limited
the impact of its requirements of counsel and transcripts by narrow-
ing the kinds of proceedings in which they must be provided. The
Court has thus refused to extend its requirements of counsel to state
discretionary appeals or to applications for certiorari to the Supreme
234 351 U.S. at 20.
235 Id.
236 372 U.S. 487 (1963).
237 Id. 495-96.
238 Douglas, like Griffin, provided no constraints on state flexibility in complying
with its mandate as long as counsel was provided. The dissent in Douglas argued,
however, that requiring counsel was itself too restrictive of state flexibility, since,
unlike the transcript cases, no adequate substitutes for counsel exist. 372 U.S. at
364 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Court has in fact sought ways to encourage
substitutes for paid counsel, at least for habeas corpus proceedings. See Bounds v.
Smith, 97 S. Ct. 1491 (1977); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
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Court 239 and has limited the situations that require transcripts by
holding that they need not be furnished in federal habeas corpus
proceedings. 240
In Bounds v. Smith 241 the Supreme Court recently extended
the transcript and counsel cases by affirming a district court order
requiring North Carolina to provide a law library to state prisoners
in order to ensure protection of the prisoners' "constitutional right
of access to the courts." 242 Bounds was an unusual indigent defense
case in that it concerned a review not of a state court interpretation
of the Constitution but of a federal district court order mandating
state action.2 43 But the Court emphasized, as in Griffin, that states
should have wide latitude to evaluate the methods used to provide
the constitutionally required access, and even encouraged "local
experimentation." 244 In fact, the library system proposed in Bounds
was suggested by the state itself, and it was considerably less exten-
sive-and expensive-than the one plaintiffs had sought.2 4 5 The
Court in Bounds recognized that economic feasibility was an appro-
priate factor to consider in choosing among possible alternatives, 246
and suggested a wide array of alternatives available to other states in
fulfilling their constitutional obligation, some of which-such as
volunteer attorneys or law students-require no state expenditures
at all.2 47 Bounds therefore did not significantly expand the demands
on the state treasury or limit the flexibility of the state to meet
those demands.
Griffin, Douglas, and Bounds thus involve a considerably more
limited intrusion into local democratic decisionmaking than the
orders in the institution cases. The Court did not design a detailed
list of requirements that a state must provide, regardless of cost, in
order to meet the constitutional standards, as is commonly done in
the institution cases,2 48 but emphasized flexibility and local experi-
mentation. The Court did not establish standards of quality that
239 Ross v. Mofft, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
240 United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317 (1976).
24197 S. Ct. 1491 (1977).
242 Id. 1494.
2 4 3 The Court did not take note of this distinction.
244 Id. 1500.
245 See id. 1493-94.
246 Id. 1496.
247 Id. 1499-1500. Recently a federal district court refused to require the state
creation of a law library, finding state supported legal assistance to prisoners ade-
quate to meet the requirements of Bounds v. Smith. Hall v. Maryland, 433 F.
Supp. 756 (D. Md. 1977).
248 See, e.g., cases cited notes 21 & 49-70 supra.
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necessitate continuing judicial supervision of their achievement: it
required no minimum kind of transcript, no minimum counsel-
client ratio, no minimum quality library-indeed, no library at all.
The Court simply articulated in general terms the constitutional
standard the localities must meet and allowed them to design their
compliance to fit both local circumstances and local budgets. Such
an approach avoids the necessity of judicial control of local govern-
ment functions to ensure achievement of judicial standards. In
short, because unavoidable mandated costs are relatively small,
249
these cases are likely to cause little impact on the democratic man-
agement of government, and because the federal judicial intrusion
is limited, little unwarranted federal control of state decisionmaking
is required.
2. The Desegregation Cases
The implementation of the Supreme Court's decision in Brown
v. Board of Education,250 declaring unconstitutional the de jure
segregation of public schools, produced the most dramatic con-
frontation between federal judicial power and state and local au-
thority in modern times. But a careful reading of Supreme Court
decisions in this area demonstrates the Court's efforts to minimize
judicial interference in the operation of local school systems. The
basis of the Court's approach to enforcing its decision in Brown was
announced the following year in Brown 11: 251
Full implementation of these constitutional principles
may require solution of varied local school problems.
School authorities have the primary responsibility for eluci-
dating, assessing, and solving these problems; courts will
have to consider whether the action of school authorities
constitutes good faith implementation of the governing
constitutional principles ...
In fashioning and effectuating [their] decrees, the
courts will be guided by equitable principles. Tradition-
ally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility
in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and
reconciling public and private needs. These cases call for
the exercise of these traditional attributes of equity power.
252
249 See text accompanying note 223 supra.
250 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
251 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
252 Id. 299-300 (footnotes omitted).
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The Court's preference for local responsibility for designing the
desegregation of school systems, if done in good faith, its insistence
on "practical flexibility" 253 by the courts, and its requirement of
"all deliberate speed" 254 rather than immediate execution of its
mandate, reflect its willingness to allow conscientious local boards
to determine the nature and timing of the remedy for the constitu-
tional violation in light of the practical difficulties involved.
For more than a decade, however, the Court reviewed cases
concerning not attempted good faith complaince but massive de-
fiance of "the minimal requirement of Brown: that segregation cease
being enforced by law." 255 The Court left no doubt of its unwill-
ingness to allow its reliance on local decisionmaking to permit re-
jection of desegregation.2 56 In Griffin v. Prince Edwards County
School Board,257 for example, the county had attempted to avoid
desegregation by closing its public schools while funding private
schools for white children. In order to remedy such defiance, the
Court said that,
the District Court may, if necessary to prevent further
racial discrimination, require the Supervisors to exercise
the power that is theirs to levy taxes to raise funds adequate
to reopen, operate, and maintain without racial discrimi-
nation a public school system in Prince Edward County
like that operated in other counties in Virginia.
258
Nothing in the Court's opinion suggests that exercise of such an
affirmative intervention in local affairs would be appropriate, let
alone routine, in a case in which resistance to the Court's decision
was less absolute. Rather, the Griffin Court, frustrated by every
kind of obstruction of the constitutional mandate,25 9 simply sought
to make clear that localities were required to exercise their power
to achieve desegregation.
In 1968 the Court considered the appropriate judicial power
over a locality that had adopted a plan purporting to comply with
the requirements of Brown. In Green v. County School Board 26o
253 Id. 300.
254 Id. 301.
255 A. BICKEL, THE SUPE COURT AND THE IDEA OF PnoGimss 126 (1970).
256 See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
257 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
258 Id. 233. This sentence engendered the Court's first dissent in a desegrega-
tion case. See id. 234.
259 See id. 226, 229.
260391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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the Court rejected as inadequate the county's opening of its school
system to all students on a freedom-of-choice basis, holding that
abolishing a segregated school system required more than merely
ending legal segregation. "School boards such as the respondent
then operating state-compelled dual systems" the Court said, "were
c . .dearly charged [by Brown 1] with the affirmative duty to take
whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system
in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and
branch." 261 But while the Green Court made clear that desegrega-
tion must include affirmative steps to dismantle the segregated school
system, it did not seek to alter the comparative role of the federal
courts and the local school board, as enunciated in Brown II, in
designing and effectuating that desegregation. The issue remained
whether the school board acted in good faith to provide relief "at
the earliest 'practicable' date;" if so, the federal court would accept
the plan as effective.2 62 Indeed, because an integrated school system
could be achieved in New Kent County, the subject of the litigation
in Green, simply by rezoning the school attendance patterns,2 63 no
major judicial displacement of local power would be likely once the
legal standard was clarified.
Three years later, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education,264 the Court sought to clarify further the appropriate
federal judicial role in desegregation cases. While the Court at-
tempted to ensure broad federal judicial power to fashion a remedy
for desegregation upon "default" 265 by the school authorities, it
recognized that "there are limits" 266 to that judicial power. It
therefore analyzed the district court's order under review to deter-
mine if it was "reasonable, feasible and workable." 267 In doing so,
the Swann Court upheld the power of the district court to override
the judgment of the recalcitrant school board in the determination
of what was necessary for dismantling the dual system, but it did
not require immediate compliance regardless of the practical prob-
lems involved. As a result, the Court approved the district court's
order of more busing of students than desired by the local board,
but only after finding that the decree was "well within the capacity
261 Id. 437-38.
262 Id. 439.
2 6 3
See G. GuNTzaR, CONSTrETJTIONAL LAW: CASES AiD MATE: Ams 725
(1975).
264 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
265 Id. 16.
266 Id. 28.
267 Id. 31.
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of the school authority" 268 and that the additional buses needed
"could easily be obtained." 269 In matters of school construction,
the Court emphasized the importance of construction decisions to
racial segregation, but noted at the same time the complexity of
factors that a school board must consider before making such a
decision. 270 It therefore required only that the courts and the school
boards ensure that the construction policy not be used to perpetuate
or establish a dual system, a requirement that falls far short of au-
thorizing a district court itself to order new school construction
when it feels it necessary to achieve desegregation.27 1  In fact, be-
cause of the particular facts of the case, the Swann Court's review
of appropriate federal judicial power in school desegregation cases
was quite limited. It did not deal either with a district court order
opposed by a local board on feasibility rather than policy grounds,
or one concerning a school board attempt to comply with the de-
segregation requirement "in good faith."
Most recently in Milliken v. Bradley 272 the Court upheld a
district court's order that Michigan provide funds for remedial edu-
cation, not only on the eleventh amendment grounds discusssed
earlier 273 but also as a proper exercise of equitable discretion. In
doing so the Court emphasized the limited nature of judicial inter-
vention in local decisionmaking. The state, which had agreed to
fund projects considerably more expensive than those it opposed in
court, could hardly oppose the relatively minor fiscal burden imposed
by the district court order on the grounds of impracticality or in-
feasibility.2 7 4 Moreover, the Detroit Board of Education had pro-
posed the requirement of the items involved in the litigation itself;
it had even encouraged the district court to issue its order, pre-
sumably as a means of obtaining state revenue for the financially
starved city schools.2 75 Thus Milliken did not present a case of ex-
cessive, or even unwelcome, intrusion into the operation of the local
school system. In upholding the district court's order, the Court
seemed to go out of its way to distinguish the facts of Milliken from
a case that more seriously invaded local authority:
26s Id. 30.
269 Id. 30 n.12.
270 Id. 20-21.
271 But of. Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. La. 1972) (court
ordered construction of new prison hospital).
272 97 S. Ct. 2749 (1977).
273 See text accompanying notes 199-207 supra.
274 See 97 S. Ct. at 2755, 2765; note 211 supra.
275 See 97 S. Ct. at 2764.
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Nor do we find any other reason to believe that the
broad and flexible equity powers of the court were abused
in this case. The established role of local school authorities
was maintained inviolate, and the remedy is indeed
remedial ....
Nor are principles of federalism abrogated by the
decree. The District Court has neither attempted to re-
structure local governmental entities nor to mandate a
particular method or structure of state or local financing.
• . The District Court has, rather, properly enforced
the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment consistent
with our prior holdings, and in a manner that does not
jeopardize the integrity of the structure or functions of
state and local government.
276
The cumulative impact of the desegregation cases thus falls far
short of authorizing unlimited federal judicial interference in local
decisionmaking to ensure compliance with a constitutional mandate.
Indeed, twenty-four years after Brown, the cases seem instead to
demonstrate an extraordinarily patient recognition of the need for
local responsibility and of the practical restraints the localities face
in achieving compliance with the constitutional mandate. The
Court's reliance on notions of "practical flexibility," "deliberate
speed," "feasibility," and "workability" are in sharp contrast to the
orders issued in the institution cases. No Supreme Court order in
the school desegregation cases has threatened to close a state's schools
unless it forthwith meets constitutional standards regardless of cost.
Instead, the Court has consistently sought to place primary respon-
sibility for the designing and timing of compliance in the hands of
local authorities as long as they were acting in "good faith." Even
when local authorities are in default, the Court has tried to limit
the judicial role. Although the federal courts have overturned im-
portant school policies to ensure enforcement of the Constitution,
only a small part of educational policy has been superseded by court
order. In no desegregation order approved by the Court have the
federal courts invaded the established role of local authorities in
virtually every major aspect of school policy, the quasi-executive
role often assumed by the lower federal courts in the institution
cases.27 7 Finally, however intrusive a desegregation order may be,
276 Id. 2761, 2763.
277 This is not to say that lower federal courts have not exercised powers com-
parable to that exercised in institution cases in desegregation cases not reviewed by
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there is an end to the federal judicial role in school policy. Once
the school district has desegregated, the Court has held that the
district court has "fully performed its function" and no further pro-
ceedings are necessary.278 In contrast, if the institutions must main-
tain a constitutionally prescribed minimum of services, that mini-
mum, enforced by the federal courts, will last in perpetuity. Each
future budget-indeed every major administrative decision concern-
ing maintenance, staffing, or treatment in the institutions-can en-
gender judicial supervision to determine whether the institution is
maintaining the amount and kind of services constitutionally re-
quired. In terms of the extent and duration of federal court in-
volvement in the management of local government, the institution
cases-particularly in view of their insistence on compliance not-
withstanding the cost-exceed the judicial role approved by the
Supreme Court in the desegregation cases.
3. The Reapportionment Cases
Although the reapportionment cases do not involve the alloca-
tion of government resources, they are relevant here because they
involve the federal courts in a dramatic intervention in local demo-
cratic decisionmaking. But in Reynolds v. Sims 7 9 having declared
the state legislative apportionments under review unconstitutional,
the Court emphasized that "legislative reapportionment is primarily
a matter for legislative consideration and determination, and that
judicial relief becomes appropriate only when a legislature fails to
reapportion according to federal constitutional requisites in a timely
the Supreme Court. A receivership of South Boston High School has been enforced
to implement a desegregation order, Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527 (1st
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 743 (1977), the court relying principally on the
institution cases as authority for such a remedy. Id. 533. Even that very extensive
order, however, is distinguishable from those imposed in the institution cases. It
was issued only because of massive resistance to desegregation, id. 533-34, and was
a temporary expedient simply to bring the school in compliance with the desegrega-
tion plan, id. 535. The receiver was the Boston Superintendent of Schools, and the
capital improvements made were only those he recommended. Morgan v. McDon-
ough, 548 F.2d 28, 29 (1st Cir. 1977). Even the most extraordinary remedy-
appointing new school officials for a fixed term, albeit officials nominated by the
School Superintendent, id. 30-32-was justified as a means to end the receivership
as quicldy as possible. Id. 33. Yet the remedy in the Boston case was extraordi-
nary indeed, as the court acknowledged, id. 30, and it is by no means clear that
even it can be defended as a legitimate exercise of federal equitable power. See
Roberts, The Extent of Federal Justicial Equitable Power: Receivership of South
Boston High School, 12 N. ENG. L. REv. 55 (1976). But see Comment, Equitable
Remedies: An Analysis of Judicial Utilization of Neoreceiverships to Implement
Large Scale Institutional Change, 1976 Wis. L. Rlv. 1161.
278 Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 437 (1976).
279377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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fashion after having had an adequate opportunity to do so." 280
More significantly, the Court did not authorize federal courts to
mandate affirmative legislative action to enact a new apportionment
plan if the legislature fails to act. Instead it suggested the proper
relief by approving the district court's decision in that case to issue
a temporary plan pending legislative action, a plan "admittedly pro-
visional in purpose so as not to usurp the primary responsibility for
reapportionment which rests with the legislature." 281 The Court in
fact has held that a district court's order mandating legislative en-
actment of a particular apportionment plan impermissibly limited
the state's "freedom of choice to devise substitutes for an apportion-
ment plan found unconstitutional." 282
The standard remedy for legislative failure to reapportion has
therefore become issuance by a federal court of a provisional re-
apportionment plan.283 This is, of course, an extraordinary remedy,
but it is considerably more restrained than ordering the legislature
to act itself or forcing legislative action by presenting an option-
such as prison closing in the institution cases 284-that is not in fact
viable. By adopting its own plan, the court avoids direct confronta-
tion with legislative power and even allows the legislature to delay
indefinitely enactment of its plan. However undesirable it is to the
legislators to have to run in court-designed districts, this option may
seem preferable to devising a solution themselves. Even today some
legislatures have not yet passed a constitutional reapportionment
plan.2 5 The Court was able to adopt the device of having federal
280 Id. 586; see Maryland Comm'n for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S.
656, 676 (1964).
281 377 U.S. at 586.
282 Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 85 (1966).
28
3 No Supreme Court case has authorized a federal court injunction requiring
legislative action, although, at the same time, the Court has never indicated that
such an action would be erroneous. Justice Frankfurter said in Colegrove v. Green,
328 U.S. 549, 555 (1946), that it "never occured to anyone that this Court could
issue mandamus to compel Congress to perform its mandatory duty to apportion;"
it might, however, occur to someone now.
284 See text accompanying notes 87-91 supra.
286 For example, legislative apportionment in Mississippi was invalidated in
1962, Connor v. Johnson, 256 F. Supp. 962 (S.D. Miss. 1966), aff'd, 386 U.S. 483
(1967), and, after no legislative reapportionment occured, the district court adopted
its own plan for the 1967 elections, Connor v. Johnson, 265 F. Supp. 492 (S.D.
Miss. 1967). A subsequent legislative attempt to reapportion was held unconsti-
tutional, Connor v. Johnson, 330 F. Supp. 506 (S.D. Miss. 1971), so that the
district court again formulated a plan for the 1971 elections. That plan was the
basis of the 1971 elections due to time constraints, despite a Supreme Court decision
that it violated constitutional standards, Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690 (1971),
404 U.S. 549 (1972). Notwithstanding that decision, the legislature- adopted with
minor modification the district court's 1971 plan as its permanent plan, a decision
approved by the district court, Connor v. Waller, 396 F. Supp. 1308 (S.D. Miss.
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courts, rather than legislatures, issue and implement reapportion-
ment plans because they could do so without appearing to enact
legislation. Unlike the effects of legislation, the public is not regu-
lated by the adoption of a reapportionment plan because the public
has no legal interest in the precise lines that describe voting districts
as long as the suffrage itself is not impaired; 286 only the legislators
are the object of the judicial action. In fact, rather than under-
mining the democratic nature of legislation, such judicial action is
designed to promote popular control of government. 28s The courts
can further insulate themselves from acting like legislatures by
issuing their plans without even confronting the types of political
pressures and other considerations that legislatures would have to
consider; courts simply rely on mathematical criteria.28  Thus the
courts have been able to ensure relatively speedy legislative reap-
portionment in a way as unintrusive to legislative or democratic
interests as possible.
To further curtail the federal judicial intervention involved in
reapportionment, the Supreme Court has limited the power of dis-
trict courts even in the adoption of their own plans by requiring
avoidance of excessive interference with state responsibilities. In
Minnesota State Senate v. Beens,28 9 for example, the Court vacated
the order of a district court that sought, as part of a temporary re-
apportionment plan, to reduce substantially the number of state
senators and representatives, stating that such a reduction nullified
a valid state policy concerning the size of the legislature. Similarly,
in White v. Weiser2 90 the Court rejected the district court's action
ordering elections under one plan when another, more acceptable
to the state, also met constitutional requirements. The Court noted
1975), but overturned by the Supreme Court, Connor v. Wailer, 421 U.S. 656
(1975). The district court then formulated another temporary plan for the 1975
elections and, under yet another Supreme Court order, Connor v. Coleman, 425 U.S.
675 (1976), the district court adopted a plan for the 1979 elections. Last term, in
Connor v. Finch, 97 S. Ct. 1828 (1977), the Supreme Court held the 1979 plan
unconstitutional. In its most recent decision, the Court urged the district court-
not the legislature-to draw up a constitutionally acceptable plan expeditiously.
Id. 1839.
28G See United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburg v. Carey, 97 S. Ct. 996
(1977).
287 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964).
288 Last term the Court emphasized that the courts, unlike the legislature, have
no authority to reconcile the conflicting state policies regarding apportionment, so
that they must exercise their power "circumspectly." Connor v. Finch, 97 S. Ct.
1828, 1833-34 (1977). That circumspection is made possible by reliance on mathe-
matical criteria. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, rehearing denied, 411 U.S.
922 (1973).
2S9406 U.S. 187 (1972).
290412 U.S. 783 (1973).
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that the "district court should not pre-empt the legislative task nor
'intrude upon state policy any more than necessary.' "291
The institution cases permit no method comparable to the re-
apportionment device of fashioning judicially created remedies
rather than mandating legislatively created ones. Money can be
raised only by the legislature. A judicial attempt to impose a tax
itself, although once suggested as a remedy,292 has never been imple-
mented; such an action seems farfetched as an exercise of judicial
power. Imposing a tax-like reallocation of the budget 293-would
involve the judicial enactment of legislation and would require
judicial consideration of all the complexities that are normally the
legislature's responsibility. Seizing and selling state property 2 4 ap-
pears no more plausible, particularly because the use of capital
assets to fund permanently mandated operating costs is an inade-
quate, even irresponsible, method of government financing. Despite
the attempts of one district court,295 legislative action to find the
money necessary to pay for the court decrees cannot be avoided.
Furthermore, implementation of the orders, once the money is
found, can be carried out only by the executive. Appointing a
master not just to supervise compliance but to exercise executive
power to effectuate it, even if a permissible exercise of judicial
power, could only be a temporary expedient.296 Operations of the
291 Id. 795.
292 In Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565 (1918), Virginia obtained a
$12 million judgment against West Virginia and sought a writ of mandamus in the
Supreme Court to compel the West Virginia legislature to levy the necessary taxes
to pay the judgment. The Court on its own raised the issue whether it might direct
and supervise the levy of a tax itself, without relying on action by West Virginia,
but left the question unresolved. It decided instead not to dispose of the case
finally but to give the legislature time to consider taxation and to give Congress,
which also had power to act, time to consider appropriate legislation. Id. 604-05.
West Virginia then paid the judgment voluntarily. See Comment, Enforcement of
Judicial Financing Orders: Constitutional Rights in Search of a Remedy, 59 Gzo.
L.J. 393, 395-99 (1970). Many courts in fact deny that they possess power to levy
taxes. See, e.g., Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707, 712-13 (N.D. Ohio 1971),
aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
293 The court suggested in Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974)
that a possible remedy might be to enjoin "state officials from authorizing expendi-
tures for nonessential state functions, and thereby alter the state budget." Id. 1317.
294 This, too, was a suggestion in Wyatt v. Aderholt. Id.
295 Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974), aff'd in part, vacated
in part, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977); see text accompanying notes 40-46 supra.
296 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently held that the proper
role for a master would be "to observe, and to report his observations to the Court,
with no authority to intervene in daily prison operations." Newman v. Alabama,
559 F.2d 283, 290 (5th Cir. 1977) (emphasis in original). Masters appointed in
institution cases in fact have not generally been involved in umplementation of the
orders themselves but simply in supervising that implementation for the court. See,
e.g., New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 409 F. Supp. 608,
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prisons and mental institutions cannot be removed from the execu-
tive branch of government. If the constitutional mandate in the
institution cases is to be implemented, therefore, the courts must
decide how properly to assure the affirmative exercise of legislative
and executive power to do so.
4. The Institution Cases in the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court to date has decided only two cases that raise
the issues involved in the institution cases, and these two decisions
are important not for what they decide but rather for the fact they
decide so little. In O'Connor v. Donaldson 297 the plaintiff, who
had been involuntarily committed in a Florida state mental hospital
for almost fifteen years, alleged that officials in that institution had
unconstitutionally denied him his liberty by denying him the right
to treatment. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, foreshadowing
its landmark decision the same year in Wyatt v. Aderholt,29s held
that the plaintiff had "a constitutional right to receive such indi-
vidual treatment as will give him a reasonable opportunity to be
cured or to improve his mental condition." 299 If such a right to
treatment existed, massive changes in the institutions would be re-
quired, as Wyatt demonstrates,300 although the Fifth Circuit in
Donaldson did not require such changes because the plaintiff, who
had been released from the institution, merely sought damages from
institution officials. The Supreme Court decision, however, avoided
the critical question of whether there was a right to treatment. The
Court instead emphasized that no effort had been made to cure
Donaldson's illness and that he was neither dangerous nor incapable
of surviving in freedom. There was, in short, no adequate reason
for depriving him of his liberty at all. He therefore stated a cause
of action for violation of his constitutional rights simply because he
was denied his liberty without justification. Because, in the Court's
view, Donaldson could have and should have been released, no
question of a right to treatment arose. Affirmative obligations on
the institution are necessary only for those who cannot be released.
608 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1212 (N.D. Ohio
1974); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 377 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part,
remanded in part, decision reserved in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974). But cf. note 277 supra (receiver appointed to implement
desegregation order). See generally Note, supra note 22.
297422 U.S. 563 (1975).
298503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
299 493 F.2d 507, 520 (5th Cir. 1974), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in
part, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
300 See text accompanying notes 21-33 supra.
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Thus the Supreme Court in Donaldson avoided any hint of financial
responsibility on the part of the state and even avoided promulgat-
ing a constitutional doctrine that would mandate increased govern-
ment expenditures on mental institutions. Indeed, as if to under-
score the narrowness of its holding, the Court seemed to go out of
its way to negate the effect of the court of appeal's decision. 301
In Estelle v. Gamble 0 2 the Supreme Court decided a case con-
cerning prison conditions as narrowly as it had decided the rights of
mental patients in Donaldson. Estelle, an inmate of a Texas prison,
alleged that certain prison officials failed to give him proper medical
treatment for injuries he suffered while in prison and sued the
officials for damages. The inadequate treatment given to Estelle
might well have been due to the fact that the Texas prison system
has had, at various times, only one to three doctors to care for 17,000
prisoners,0 3 but the Court did not suggest any minimum medical
care that needed to be given to prisoners as a matter of constitutional
law. Instead, the Court held that inadequate medical treatment
would constitute unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment
only if there had been "deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs of prisoners." 304 Despite serious shortcomings in the treat-
ment of Estelle, the Court held that, although the treatment might
constitute medical malpractice under state tort law, such neglectful
treatment did not constitute a constitutional violation. Thus, like
Donaldson, Estelle articulated a constitutional standard that created
no obligation on the state to improve its facilities. The responsi-
bility of state officials, as a matter of constitutional law, was simply
not to cause injury deliberately, and that responsibility was met
even though the prison was understaffed.30 Only Justice Stevens,
dissenting alone, argued that such a constitutional standard was in-
appropriate and that a minimum standard of medical care should
be required.30 0
The Supreme Court's refusal to date to adopt the broad grounds
of the lower federal courts in dealing with inadequacies in the level
of care provided in institutions may be explained by the fact that
301 "Of necessity our decision vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals
deprives that court's opinion of precedential effect, leaving this Court's opinion and
judgment as the sole law of the case." 422 U.S. at 577 n.12.
802429 U.S. 97 (1976).
303 Id 110 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
304 Id. 104.
305n remand the complaint was dismissed. Gamble v. Estelle, 554 F.2d
653 (5th Cir. 1977).
306429 U.S. at 116 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the cases as presented did not require it to do so.307 But the Court
might have also avoided those grounds because of its reluctance to
adopt the kind of affirmative remedies the lower court cases envision.
B. The Relevance of Cost in Constitutional Decisionmaking
Although the Supreme Court has limited the affirmative impact
of its remedies to avoid excessive federal judicial interference in
local decisionmaking,305 it has never specifically addressed the im-
portance of limiting judicial impact on the public purse in the
delineation of appropriate judicial remedies for constitutional vio-
lations. In the cases defining the extent of the constitutional pro-
tection provided by procedural due process and by the equal protec-
tion clause, however, the Court has dealt directly with protecting
the governmental interest in economy, albeit with some incon-
sistency. Taken as a whole, however, cases in these areas demon-
strate that the Court is willing to recognize the government's interest
in avoiding increased expenditures even in its formulation of con-
stitutional standards.
1. The Procedural Due Process Cases
Goldberg v. Kelly,309 which prescribed the procedures required
before welfare payments could be terminated, provided the first op-
portunity for a Supreme Court statement on the relevance of cost in
constitutional decisionmaking. That statement was ambiguous. One
year after Goldberg, the Court in Bell v. Burson 310 read Goldberg
as largely denying the significance of an impact on the public
treasury.311 But the Goldberg Court, before defining the procedures
required by due process, sought to demonstrate that "the State is not
without weapons to minimize . . . [the] increased costs." 312 The
Court argued that much of the drain on fiscal and administrative
resources mandated by the Court's requirement of procedures could
807 Estelle, for example, did not require the Court to decide what would con-
stitute "deliberate indifference" by the state itself in failing adequately to fund
institutions or, indeed, if that would be the appropriate standard in institution cases.
If some sort of intent must be shown before a state could be responsible for insti-
tutional conditions, many of the institution cases would be unable to meet that
constitutional standard. Compare Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976) with text accompanying note 91 supra.
3 0 8 See text accompanying notes 220-307 supra.
309397 U.S. 254 (1970).
310402 U.S. 535 (1971).
311 Id. 540-41.
312 397 U.S. at 266.
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be reduced by carefully devised hearings and the skillful use of per-
sonnel. Thus, only after conceding the interest in economy, did
the Court, influenced perhaps by what it thought was the modest
extent of the economic impact it was requiring, find that the inter-
ests sought to be protected "clearly" outweighed the state's concern
to prevent an increase in expenses.313 Little notice has since been
taken of this attempt at cost-analysis in Goldberg. Instead, Gold-
berg has been read broadly, as did Chief Justice Burger in dissent,
who warned that "new layers of procedural protection may become
an intolerable drain on the very funds earmarked for food, clothing,
and other living essentials." 314
In the years following Goldberg, however, the Court continued
a dual approach to the fiscal burden issue. While citing Goldberg
to denigrate the issue's significance in Bell v. Burson, the Court al-
most simultaneously recognized it, without mentioning Goldberg,
in Richardson v. Perales,315 a case limiting the need for physicians to
testify at disability hearings. In Richardson the Court stated that
the cost of such a requirement, "although not controlling," was a
pragmatic factor that deserved mention. 316 In subsequent cases,
when costs were to be deemed insignificant, the Court simply cited
Goldberg and Bell v. Burson for the proposition that "these rather
ordinary costs cannot outweigh the constitutional right." 317 When
costs were significant, however, as in the question of whether counsel
was required in probation hearings, the Court would be pragmatic
and omit reference to Goldberg:
Certainly, the decisionmaking process will be prolonged,
and the financial cost to the State-for appointed counsel,
counsel for the State, a longer record, and the possibility of
judicial review-will not be insubstantial.
In some cases, these modifications in the nature of the
revocation hearing must be endured and the costs borne
... . But due process is not so rigid as to require that
the significant interests in informality, flexibility, and econ-
omy must always be sacrificed.318
In recent years the Court's recognition of the significance of
costs has increased, and, rather than attempting to read Goldberg
313 Id.
314Id. 284 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
315402 U.S. 389 (1971).
316 Id. 406.
317 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22 (1972).
318 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788 (1973) (footnote omitted).
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narrowly, the Court has virtually eliminated citation to Goldberg
altogether.3 19 Chief Justice Burger's emphasis in his Goldberg dis-
sent of the tradeoff between program costs and administrative costs
has instead become accepted. Even in cases expanding procedural
due process protection, such as Goss v. Lope, 320 the Court has
limited procedural requirements because it recognized that stricter
requirements might, "by diverting resources, cost more than it would
save in [program] effectiveness." 321 The Court's increasing recog-
nition of the impact of its procedural due process decisions on the
legislative allocation of resources between administrative costs and
program costs can best be seen in the two most important recent
procedural due process cases, Mathews v. Eldridge 32 2 and Ingraham
v. Wright.
3 23
In Mathews the Court decided the extent of constitutionally
mandated procedural requirements before Social Security disability
benefits could be terminated, an issue related to the Goldberg issue
of the procedural requirements required before welfare benefits
could be terminated. Distinguishing Goldberg, the Court held that
a prior evidentiary hearing was not required for disability recipients,
in part because the hardship of termination on the recipient and the
need for additional safeguards to ensure fairness and reliability in
the termination were less for the disability recipient than the welfare
recipient.3 4 The Court then considered a final factor, which it
labeled the "public interest," 325 in determining the proper due
process safeguards. In doing so the Court provided the most ex-
tensive statement to date of the relevance of increased cost to con-
stitutional standards:
The most visible burden [of a prior evidentiary hearing]
would be the incremental cost resulting from the increased
number of hearings and the expense of providing benefits
to ineligible recipients pending decision. No one can pre-
dict the extent of the increase . . . . The parties submit
widely varying estimates of the probable additional finan-
cial cost. We only need say that experience with the con-
stitutionalizing of government procedures suggests that the
319 A recent exception occurred last term in Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l,
97 S. Ct. 2010, 2020 (1977).
320419 U.S. 565 (1975).
321 Id. 583.
322 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
323 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
324 424 U.S. at 335-47.
325 Id. 347.
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ultimate additional cost in terms of money and administra-
tive burden would not be insubstantial.
Financial cost alone is not a controlling weight in de-
termining whether due process requires a particular pro-
cedural safeguard prior to some administrative decision.
But the Government's interest, and hence that of the
public, in conserving scarce fiscal and administrative re-
sources, is a factor that must be weighed. At some point
the benefit of an additional safeguard to the individual
affected by the administrative action and to society in terms
of increased assurance that the action is just, may be out-
weighed by the cost. Significantly, the cost of protecting
those whom the preliminary administrative process has
identified as likely to be found undeserving may in the end
come out of the pockets of the deserving since resources
available for any particular program of social welfare are
not unlimited.8
2
The Court seemed to imply more in Mathews v. Eldridge when it
required costs to be "weighed" than it did in Goldberg when it
found that cost-saving was "outweighed" by other interests. Costs
now seem to weigh more, but the Court has not attempted to define
how one tells how much they weigh or how that weight can be
compared with that of competing interests. But the fact that the
importance of cost-saving considerations has increased was demon-
strated in Ingraham v. Wright.
327
In Ingraham the Court, having decided that protection against
corporal punishment in schools was a constitutionally protected
liberty interest, held that the availability of state remedies for exces-
sive punishment provided a constitutionally adequate protection for
that interest. In a dramatic departure from previous cases, 328 the
Court refused to require any federal procedure because it found that
any incremental gain from such a procedure would not justify its
cost. Citing the language from Mathews quoted above that "at
some point" the need for safeguards would be outweighed by the
cost, the Ingraham Court stated that "that point has been reached
in this case." 329 The risk of error, in light of existing safeguards,
was minimal, the Court said, but the imposition of procedural safe-
guards "would also entail a significant intrusion into an area of
326 Id. 347-48.
327430 U.S. 651 (1977).
328 See id. 696-97 (WVhite, J., dissenting).
329 Id. 682.
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primary educational responsibility." 330 Even the dissent agreed that
a balance had to be struck, although it found the risk of error greater
and the intrusion into the disciplinary process "exaggerated." 33,
Thus the majority and dissent in Ingraham seemed to disagree not
about the importance of the cost of procedures in the definition of
constitutional requirements but about what that cost would in fact
be. If, then, "at some point" costs are such that they affect the
definition of due process requirements, one might expect as well
that "at some point" they would also affect the nature of the ap-
propriate remedy for due process violations. The reason for the
relevance of cost in either case is the same: mandating increased
costs on government affects the government's allocation of its finite
resources.
2. The Equal Protection Cases
The Supreme Court has also considered the potential impact on
governmental costs relevant to its equal protection cases. The
Court is generally reluctant to overturn on equal protection grounds
any legislative judgment concerning the allocation of government
resources.332 Referring to the distribution of welfare funds in
Dandridge v. Williams,33 3 the Court observed:
[T]he intractable economic, social, and even philosophical
problems presented by public welfare assistance programs
are not the business of this Court. . . . [T]he Constitu-
tion does not empower this Court to second-guess state
officials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocat-
ing limited public welfare funds among the myriad of
potential recipients. 38 4
As part of this deference to legislative discretion in budget alloca-
tion, the Court has recognized that the government's desire to avoid
an increase in its expenditures may explain its decision to exclude
some people from government spending programs. The legitimacy
of that interest was, in part, the basis for the Court's upholding of
Maryland's maximum welfare grant provision in Dandridge, al-
330 Id.
331Id. 700 (White, J., dissenting).
332 The Court recently reemphasized the peculiar deference given to legislative
judgments in budget allocation. See Matthews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185
(1976).
333 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
334 Id. 487.
778 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
though it found other plausible reasons for the state statute.33
More significantly, in Geduldig v. Aiello 336 the Court upheld
against an equal protection attack the exclusion of pregnancy ben-
efits from a government disability program, an exclusion based
solely on the government's desire to minimize the cost of the pro-
gram. The government had created a self-supporting disability
program in Geduldig, and its desire not to initiate a government
subsidy, to raise the cost of the program to its subscribers, or to
lower other benefits in order to include pregnancy benefits was
enough in itself, according to the Court, to justify the exclusion of
those benefits. 337 Similarly, in Weinberger v. Salfi 338 the Court up-
held Congress' adoption of a duration-of-relationship requirement as
a prerequisite to receiving Social Security survivor's benefits, finding
the legislative decision to be a valid "substantive policy determina-
tion that limited resources would not be well spent in making indi-
vidual determinations." 339 Citing Geduldig, the Salfi Court upheld
that determination to save money without requiring a justification
for choosing that particular method of saving money over any
other.
340
Although the government's interest in limiting its expenditures
is significant in cases requiring only "rational" government decision-
making,341 that interest has less weight when efforts at economy
affect fundamental interests or result in the allocation of funds on
335 See id. 486-87.
336 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
337 Id. 496. The Court rejected the contention that a higher level of scrutiny
was required on the grounds that the exclusion discriminated against women on the
basis of sex. Id. 496 n.20.
338 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
339 Id. 784.
340 Id. 785.
341 The Court has not yet held, to be sure, that the government can protect
its purse by excluding any benefit or beneficiary it chooses, even in cases in which
the government's decision is subject only to judicial review to determine its ration-
ality. But last term, in Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 97 S. Ct.
1898 (1977), the Court, recognizing the government's interest in its fiscal integrity
as a reason for denying unemployment benefits to strikers, suggested surprisingly
that that question was still open:
It is clear that protection of the fiscal integrity of the [unemployment
benefits] fund is a legitimate concern of the State. We need not consider
whether it would be "rational" for the State to protect the fund through a
random means, such as elimination from coverage of all persons with an
odd number of letters in their surnames. Here, the limitation of liability
tracks the reasons found rational above, and the need for such limitation
unquestionably provides the legitimate state interest required by the equal
protection equation.
Id. 1910.
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"suspect" grounds, thus engendering greater judicial scrutiny. In
Shapiro v. Thompson,42 for example, the Court invalidated a one-
year residency requirement for receiving welfare benefits as an un-
constitutional infringement on the right to travel. The Court noted
that the residency requirement was designed to inhibit those who
needed relief from entering the state, an objective designed at least
in part to limit the impact of welfare costs on the public treasury.
The Court stated:
We recognize that a State has a valid interest in preserving
the fiscal integrity of its programs. It may legitimately
attempt to limit its expenditures, whether for public as-
sistance, public education, or any other program. But a
State may not accomplish such a purpose by invidious dis-
tinctions between classes of its citizens. It could not, for
example, reduce expenditures for education by barring
indigent children from its schools. Similarly, in the cases
before us, appellants must do more than show that denying
welfare benefits to new residents saves money. The saving
of welfare costs cannot justify an otherwise invidious
classification.
43
Similarly, in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County 34 the Court
invalidated a one-year residency requirement as a condition to non-
emergency hospitalization, a requirement designed in part to protect
the public treasury, although here the Court attempted to show that
the "claimed fiscal savings may well be illusory." 345
Shapiro and Maricopa County thus indicate that in cases re-
quiring heightened judicial scrutiny, the Court, although recogniz-
ing the government's interest in limiting its expenditures as a legit-
imate concern, will not allow that interest to be controlling. The
impact of these cases has been limited, however, by two subsequent
developments. First, Maher v. Roe,346 in upholding the consti-
tutionality of the government's denial of Medicaid funds for
abortions, narrowed the category of cases which require heightened
scrutiny of a governmental decision to limit its spending. The
Maher Court applied only a rationality test to the refusal to pay for
342394 U.S. 618 (1969).
843 Id. 633 (footnote omitted).
344 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
3451d. 265. The dissent commented: "However valuable a qualified cost
analysis might be . . . this sort of judgment has traditionally been confided to
legislatures ... ." Id. 287 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting),
346 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977). For a further discussion of Maher, see text accom-
panying notes 98-101 supra.
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the exercise of the constitutional right to an abortion, reasoning that
a refusal of the state to pay for services privately available does not
"penalize" the right to obtain those services. 347 The Court dis-
tinguished Shapiro and Maricopa County, saying that the govern-
ment in those cases denied all welfare funds to those exercising
constitutional rights, rather than merely refusing to pay for the
exercise of the right itself. Just as the government could refuse to
pay bus fares in the right-to-travel cases, the Court said, it could
refuse to pay for abortions. 34s It is prohibited only from denying
all welfare benefits to those who get an abortion; that prohibition
would penalize the exercise of the right. 49 The Maher Court went
on to find the government exclusion of abortion services rational
and, although it did not rely on government economy as a justifica-
tion, it was clearly less willing to scrutinize a spending decision than
a regulatory one350 The result in Maher thus significantly limits
the obligation of government to provide funding necessary for the
exercise of constitutionally protected rights.
The second, even more significant, limitation of the scope of
heightened judicial scrutiny in budget allocation decisions has come
in those cases dealing with allocations made on constitutionally
"suspect" grounds. The cases dealing with the government's power
to categorize beneficiaries of public funds on the basis of sex and
illegitimacy suggest that the government's interest in economy may
have significantly greater weight than recognized in Shapiro; if the
government does not seek to exclude a group from the receipt of
certain public funds altogether, as in the right-to-travel cases, but
simply differentiates on economy grounds between the treatment it
gives to the affected group and that it gives to others, the distinction
may well be upheld.
The complete denial of funds to one sex-like the complete
denial to those who have exercised their right to travel-violates the
equal protection clause, at least if it is based on "archaic and over-
broad" generalizations about the differences between the sexes.-1
Thus in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,352 the Court held unconstitu-
tional the denial of Social Security benefits to a beneficiary's surviv-
347 97 S. Ct. at 2382-83, 2385.
348 Id. 2383 n.8.
349 Id.
350 Compare id. with Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977)
(Court applied a compelling state interest test in finding a New York statute which
regulated distribution and advertisement of contraceptives unconstitutional).
351 Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975).
352420 U.S. 636 (1975).
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ing husband that were provided to a surviving wife.y3  Arguments
about the government's need to limit costs were not even advanced
to justify the exclusion of surviving husbands. Such arguments,
however, have been advanced in attempts to justify the requirement
that a woman must prove her husband's dependency in order to
qualify for a program's benefits although a man need not prove his
wife's dependency. In Frontiero v. Richardson 354 the Court in-
validated such a sex-based differentiation as grounded on a stereo-
typed distinction between the sexes. The plurality, however, even
though treating sex as a suspect classification for equal protection
purposes, suggested that the economic argument advanced by the
government might have changed the result had sufficient evidence
been produced:
The Government offers no concrete evidence, however,
tending to support its view that such differential treatment
in fact saves the Government any money. In order to
satisfy the demands of strict judicial scrutiny, the Govern-
ment must demonstrate, for example, that it is actually
cheaper to grant increased benefits with respect to all male
members, than it is to determine which male members are
in fact entitled to such benefits and to grant increased
benefits only to those members whose wives actually meet
the dependency requirement. Here, however, there is sub-
stantial evidence that, if put to the test, many of the wives
of male members would fail to qualify for benefits. And
in light of the fact that the dependency determination with
respect to the husbands of female members is presently
made solely on the basis of affidavits, rather than through
the more costly hearing process, the Government's explana-
tion of the statutory scheme is, to say the least, ques-
tionable.3r,
This novel proposition that the government's actual saving of money
might validate a suspect classification was qualified by the additional
statement that, in any case, administrative convenience alone could
not justify the sex-based classification.sG But in Califano v. Gold-
farb 37 the Frontiero dictum recognizing the government's interest
53 Compare id. with Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (upholding
exclusion of men from favorable economic benefits on grounds that the exclusion
was designated to compensate women as a group for past economic discrimination).
354411 U.S. 677 (1973).
355 Id. 689-90 (footnotes omitted).
356 Id. 690-91.
3G7430 U.S. 199 (1977).
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in economy was reaffirmed by five members of the Court. Goldfarb,
like Frontiero, invalidated on equal protection grounds a sex-based
differentiation requiring a man, but not a woman, to prove actual
dependency on his spouse. The plurality of four 'stated that the
"only conceivable justification" for such a classification was that it
would save the government time, money, and effort; as in Frontiero,
they said, such an administrative convenience claim had not been
verified by the government and, in any event, would not justify the
discrimination involved.358 The four dissenters disagreed, stating
that administrative convenience would justify a sex-based classifica-
tion in the allocation of social insurance funds as long as one sex
was not completely denied funds and the government's interest in
economy was in fact served by the classification. 359 Justice Stevens,
casting the deciding vote, agreed with the dissenters that the ad-
ministrative convenience rationale could justify the distinction at
issue, but he agreed with the plurality that the government's interest
in economy was not in fact served by the differentiation in Gold-
farb.3 60 Thus a majority of the Court in Goldfarb seems to have
accepted the Frontiero proposition that an actual economic saving
can justify at least some sex-based classifications affecting the dis-
persal of public funds.
The position of Justice Stevens and the four dissenters in Gold-
farb is consistent with the Court's position on classifications based on
illegitimacy, as they themselves recognized. 361 Although the Court
has declared unconstitutional the flat exclusion of a class of illegit-
mates from workmen's compensation benefits 302 or Social Security
benefits,86 the Court in Mathews v. Lucas 864 upheld a provision
that exempted all but a specific group of illegitimate children from
proof of actual dependency. Stating that saving of the expense of
individualized determinations for some cases justified the classifica-
tion, the Court relied on the Frontiero notion of the weight to be
given to such an economic argument:
In cases of strictest scrutiny, such approximations must be
supported at least by a showing that the Government's
dollar "lost" to overincluded benefit recipients is returned
by a dollar "saved" in administrative expense avoided.
358 Id. 217.
359 Id. 234-38 & n.7 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
360 Id. 219-22 (Stevens, J., concurring).
361 Id. 226-27 (Stevens, J., concurring), 236-38 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
362 See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
363 See Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
364497 U.S. 495 (1976).
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Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 689 (plurality
opinion). Under the standard of review appropriate here,
however, the materiality of the relation between the stat-
utory classifications and the likelihood of dependency they
assertedly reflect need not be " 'scientifically substan-
tiated.'" Nor, in any case, do we believe that Congress is
required in this realm of less than strictest scrutiny to
weigh the burdens of administrative inquiry solely in terms
of dollars ultimately "spent," ignoring the relative amounts
devoted to administrative rather than welfare uses.
365
The Frontiero-Goldfarb-Lucas equal protection analysis presum-
ably does not mean that any classification on suspect grounds, short
of total denial of funds, can be defended if it in fact saves the
government money. Some classifications are more suspect than
others; any racial classification, for example, may well be invalid no
matter what the economic justifications are.366 But the fact that the
Court gives the interest in economy weight even in cases dealing
with classifications based on sex and illegitimacy-and even more
weight when mere rationality is the standard of review 3 7-demon-
strates that the Court in its equal protection analysis, as in its pro-
cedural due process analysis, considers the scarcity of government
funds as a factor affecting the definition of constitutional rights.
Such a position undermines the proposition so often relied on in
the institution cases that inadequate resources are irrelevant to the
enforcement of constitutional rights.36 8 If cost figures into the
definition of constitutional rights, the relevance of cost should not
disappear once those rights are found to exist. Indeed it is less re-
strictive of personal freedom to take cost into account when deter-
mining the appropriate method of enforcing protected rights than
to deny their existence altogether because it is too costly to recognize
them. It is possible that the Court recognized the importance of
cost when remedying the constitutional violation found in Califano
v. Goldfarb.36 9 The estimated annual cost of paying Social Security
benefits to all male dependents without proof of dependency, as was
done for all female dependents, was 411 million dollars; the cost of
365 Id. 509-10 (citations omitted).
366 One might doubt, for example, whether a classification of beneficiaries on
racial grounds to determine life expectancy for pension purposes would be consti-
tutional. See Comment, Gender Classifications in the Insurance Industry, 75 COLUm.
L. Euv. 1381, 1393-95 (1975).
367 See text accompanying notes 336-40 supra.
363 See note 71 supra.
369430 U.S. 199 (1977).
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establishing procedures so that all beneficiaries, both male and
female, would have to establish dependency was estimated at 1 bil-
lion dollars.3 70 The Goldfarb Court was careful to order neither
alternative, although the normal remedy for underinclusiveness
would be either to extend the benefit to those excluded or to deny
it to all concerned.37 1 The Court, by specifying no remedy, gave the
maximum possible freedom to Congress to match the constitutional
requirements with available resources.3 72  This kind of flexibility is
what the institution cases require.
V. THE ExTENT OF THE JUDICIAL PoWER OF THE PURSE
IN THE INSTITUTION CASES
A. When Congress Acts
The current lower federal court orders mandating increased
government expenditures in the institution cases lack explicit con-
gressional authorization. If such congressional authorization were
obtained, the power of the federal courts in these cases would be
strengthened. Congress cannot, of course, extend judicial power
beyond that conferred by article III,3'1 but it could authorize
judicial action that would otherwise present "troublesome questions
about the suitability of the issues tendered for decision by the
judiciary." 374 Most complaints about unwarranted judicial inter-
ference with democratic decisionmaking would not survive an ex-
plicit congressional decision to authorize the judicial action in
question.3 75 Concerns about judicial invasion of the responsibility
of the other branches of the federal government are eased by the
direct invitation to the courts by those branches to assume the
responsibility.376 Similarly, concerns about judicial restrictions on
S70Jablon v. Secretary of HEW, 399 F. Supp. 118, 132 (D. Md. 1975), afltd,
430 U.S. 924 (1977).
371 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 361 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
372 See, e.g., H.R. 6857, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (proposing, inter alia,
that special dependency requirements for entitlement to insurance benefits for
husbands and widowers be eliminated).
373 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
374 Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HAnv.
L. REv. 645, 684 (1973).
375 Only an actual congressional decision, not inaction, will give the court
adequate popular support for its assertion of power, see Tribe, supra note 197, at
696 n.73; accordingly, the Court is less reluctant to grant standing to sue once
Congress has authorized judicial review. Scott, supra note 374, at 686-87.
376 Of course, mere unanimous consent by the three branches of government
cannot rearrange the constitutional allocation of power. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 120-43 (1976). But that consent can provide a source of power when the
responsibility is not explicitly allocated by the Constitution itself. See Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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democratic decisionmaking are diminished if the judicial action is
requested by the politically accountable branches of government.
Indeed, after congressional enactment of a statute, the only remain-
ing reason for restraint would be the limitations enforced by the
doctrine of federalism-limitations applicable against both Congress
and the judiciary. Even that concern, however, would be lessened
by congressional authorization of the federal judicial action. For
although federalism is a constitutional limit on congressional power,
it presents less of a barrier to congressional than judicial action be-
cause "the states, and their interests as such, are represented in the
Congress but not in the federal courts." 377 This ability of the states
to be heard in the congressional resolution of national policy does
not legitimate all congressional action regulating the states,378 but it
is particularly relevant when Congress is attempting to define the
extent of judicial power to enforce the fourteenth amendment.
Since that amendment is specifically designed as a federally enforced
limit on state authority,379 only a branch of the federal government
can determine the extent of its restriction of the states' authority.
That decision is best made by Congress, influenced by the repre-
sentatives of the states, but exercising federal constitutional power.
Indeed, the Constitution explicitly gives Congress the power to
enforce the fourteenth amendment.3 0 A judicial determination of
the reach of judicial power to enforce the fourteenth amendment
would not only be unrestrained by participation of the states but
would be inappropriately self-serving; in fact such a self-definition
of power would conflict with the constitutional norm since the
Constitution generally gives Congress the power to define the juris-
diction of the federal courts.381 Thus Congress, with power over
both the states and the courts, is the most appropriate forum for
resolving a conflict between federal judicial power to enforce the
fourteenth amendment and the interests of the states in the federal
system.382
377 Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie-The Thread, 87 HAmv. L.
REv. 1682, 1685 (1974) (footnote omitted); see Tribe, supra note 197, at 695 n.71.
378 See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); text accom-
panying notes 151-59 supra.
379 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1976); Ex Parte Virginia, 100
U.S. 339, 346-48 (1879).
380 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
381Id. art. III, § 2; Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869);
Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 440 (1850).
3s2 Congress' role in resolving questions of enforcement of the fourteenth
amendment is greater than its role in interpreting the scope of the amendment.
A judicial interpretation of the Constitution is not subject to congressional control;
indeed, congressional interpretation is subject to judicial scrutiny. Compare Katzen-
19781
786 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
The Supreme Court has recognized that congressional power
under the fourteenth amendment gives Congress authority to over-
ride restraints imposed on the federal judiciary to protect state
sovereignty. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer 3 8 the Court held that Con-
gress had power under the fourteenth amendment to authorize
damage actions against the states, actions that, absent a congressional
enactment, would be barred by the eleventh amendment. Congress
could override the eleventh amendment limitation and authorize
judicial impact on state treasuries, the Court said, because the
fourteenth amendment sanctioned congressional intrusion into
"spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States." 384 Al-
though the limits on the federal courts in the institution cases are
attributable not to the eleventh amendment but to judicial re-
straint,385 the power of Congress to authorize judicial action in the
institution cases would seem to be no less than its power to override
the eleventh amendment.
A bill authorizing actions in federal court against the states in
institution cases is now pending before Congress.8 s6 Its focus, how-
ever, seems more to authorize the Attorney General to initiate or
intervene in such suits-a federal court having held that he cur-
rently lacked such power 387-than to address the appropriate judicial
remedies for constitutional violations. In fact, although the bill
authorizes injunctions "or other order for preventive relief" 3ss in
private suits brought against the states, it prohibits the Attorney
General from initiating a suit unless he certifies that state officials
bach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) with Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112
(1970). But Congress can deny judicial power to issue injunctions in specific
cases, Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938) (labor disputes), unless,
perhaps, the remedy is interpreted as part of the constitutional mandate itself. See
generally Note, The Nixon Busing Bills and Congressional Power, 81 YAiX LJ.
1542 (1972).
383427 U.S. 445 (1976).
384 Id. 455.
385 See text accompanying notes 220-307 supra.
386 See H.R. 2439, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The bill has engendered
considerable controversy. Compare States Attack Carter Plan to Let Federal
Officials Sue for Inmates, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1977, at 20, col. 1 (indicating strong
opposition to bill by National Association of Attorneys General) with A Federal
Law Urged to Aid State Inmates, N.Y. Times, May 15, 1977 at 18, col. 1 (reporting
that the American Bar Association urged enactment). See States' Rights v. Victims'
Rights, N.Y. Times, May 8, 1977, § 4 at 18, col. 1 (editorial).
387 United States v. Solomon, 419 F. Supp. 358 (D. Md. 1976), aff'd, 563 F.2d
1121 (4th Cir. 1977). But see In re Estelle, 516 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 925 (1976) (interlocutory appeal for writ of mandamus dismissing
United States as intervenor denied).
388 H.R. 2439, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1977).
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"have had a reasonable time to correct" the violations.389 Presum-
ably the courts in a private cause of action could allow the states no
less. But it is the definition of a "reasonable time" for compliance
that is the cause of difficulty in the institution cases. The amount
of time reasonable to correct the violations depends on the amount
of money available to do so. Until Congress determines the extent
to which it wants the courts to determine the amount of money the
states must spend on compliance, it is unlikely to strengthen the
courts' authority to deal with the institution cases.
B. In the Absence of Congressional Action
In the absence of congressional action, the exercise of federal
judicial power to remedy constitutionally inadequate conditions in
government institutions should be tailored to allow the flexibility
encouraged by the Supreme Court in Griffin and Douglas and cases
following them,390 in light of the problems of "practicality," "feasi-
bility," and "workability" recognized by the Supreme Court in the
desegregation cases. 301 This should be done, as the Fifth Circuit in
its recent decisions in institution cases has begun to recognize,392 to
avoid excessive federal judicial invasion of local democratic decision-
making involved in the orders as now framed.393 Such a policy of
judicial restraint is characteristic of equity jurisdiction.394  As the
Court said in the context of desegregation:
[I]n constitutional adjudication as elsewhere, equitable
remedies are a special blend of what is necessary, what is
fair, and what is workable. "Traditionally, equity has
been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its
remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling
public and private needs." Brown v. Board of Education
In equity, as nowhere else, courts eschew rigid ab-
solutes and look to the practical realities and necessities
inescapably involved in reconciling competing interests,
389 Id. §4.
390 See text accompanying notes 233-49 supra.
391 See text accompanying notes 250-78 supra.
3 9 2 See Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977); Newman v. Alabama,
559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977); Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977).
None of these decisions, however, requires the degree of judicial restraint advocated
here.
39 3 See text accompanying notes 11248 supra.
394 See, e.g., A. BIczxL, supra note 117, at 249-51; D. DOBBS, supra note 91,
at 62-64 (1973).
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notwithstanding that those interests have constitutional
roots.3
9
5
The principal practical reality that the courts must accept in
shaping their remedies in the institution cases is that money is a con-
straint. They cannot continue their insistence on strict compliance
regardless of the amount of money available,396 because the limits on
government resources are no less applicable in the courtroom than
outside of it. The Supreme Court recognizes this reality, as its pro-
cedural due process and equal protection cases demonstrate.39o A
recognition that government resources are finite does not allow the
government to refuse to enforce constitutional rights because it is too
expensive to do so.39s The issue in the institution cases is not
whether there will be compliance with the Constitution-of that
there should be no doubt-but rather the timing of achieving that
compliance. Because of myriad demands for limited government re-
sources, only a certain amount of money can be allocated in any
particular year for a new expenditure, no matter how intense the
need for it. 99 A judicial decision that institutional conditions are
unconstitutional requires that money be found to correct them, but
the amount of money to be applied each year is a legislative de-
cision; this decision must be accepted by the courts if, in the words
of the desegregation cases, it is made "in good faith." 400 A court
cannot weigh the competing demands for government resources to
determine how much can be raised for the institutions, nor should
it try to force the legislature to raise the necessary money regardless
of competing considerations. The judicial impact on the purse is
acceptable only if the legislature retains its discretion to raise and
395 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200-01 (1973) (footnote omitted).
See also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 374-76
(1977).
396 The Fifth Circuit seems to acknowledge the reality of limited resources.
"[W]e recognize that it is simpler to order prison reform than to pay for it." Pugh
v. Rainwater, 557 F.2d 1189, 1192 n.9 (5th Cir. 1977).
397 See text accompanying notes 308-72 supra.
398In Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963), a case concerning
desegregation of municipal recreational facilities, the Court stated that "it is obvious
that vindication of conceded constitutional rights cannot be made dependent upon
any theory that it is less expensive to deny them than to afford them." Id. 537.
The budgetary argument in Watson was so unsupported by factual data that it
seemed frivolous. See id.
399 See note 142 supra.
400 Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968); Brown v. Board
of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).
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allocate money,401 a discretion limited by the need to meet the
judicial order but not eliminated by it. Judicial requirements of
expenditures must, in short, meet the test of feasibility, and feasi-
bility is in the first instance a legislative judgment, subject to the
requirement that the legislature's attempt to meet the constitutional
standard is in good faith. If the courts allow the legislature this
time to comply, interference with democratic decisionmaking will
be minimized to the point that judicial confrontations with legis-
lative power will become unlikely.
Courts must also recognize that detailed orders containing hun-
dreds of specifications that the executive must implement are un-
workable. The courts cannot effectively decide how many registered
nurses or square feet per patient are constitutionally required.40 2
Moreover, this level of detail necessitates continual federal judicial
supervision of the state's day-to-day management of its institutions;
the court must intervene to ensure that its plan is being carried out.
But state institutions are too complex to be administered under
court order; there are too many variables for a court to consider and
comprehend. 403 It is no answer for the court to appoint a master
to make these decisions.4°4 Basic administration must be left in the
hands of executive officials, mandated to comply with the Consti-
tution, but allowed the flexibility to do so as long as they proceed
in good faith. A federal court's insistence on literal compliance
with its own scheme ought to be recognized as having the potential
to undermine, as well as to enhance, the executive's ability to im-
prove conditions for institutionalized patients. Decisions mandating
improved mental hospital facilities can divert money needed to
deinstitutionalize patients and provide them with outpatient care.
A new prison mandated by court order might be an undesirable
substitute for small, community-based facilities. The Supreme
Court has recognized these complexities in prison administration in
words that could largely be applied to the management of all
institutions:
401 But see Friendly, The "Law of the Circuit", and All That, 46 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 406, 409-10 (1972) (arguing that, given finite resources, courts must make
what are, in effect, political decisions that impact on state spending).
402 See Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 999 (5th Cir. 1977). For develop-
ment of the view that courts possess the constitutional authority and practical
capacity to determine such issues, see Comment, Confronting the Conditions of
Confinement: An Expanded Role for Courts in Prison Reform, 12 HAnv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 367 (1977); Note, supra note 2; Comment, supra note 22, at 1297.
403 See Note, supra note 22.
404 See note 296 supra.
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Traditionally, federal courts have adopted a broad hands-
off attitude towards problems of prison administration.
In part this policy is the product of various limitations on
the scope of federal review of conditions in state penal
institutions. More fundamentally, this attitude springs
from complementary perceptions about the nature of the
problems and the efficacy of judicial intervention..
Suffice it to say that the problems of prisons in America
are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they
are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. Most
require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the com-
mitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the
province of the legislative and executive branches of
government. For all of those reasons, courts are ill
equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of
prison administration and reform. Judicial recognition of
that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism.40 5
This "healthy sense of realism" suggests that the courts should
abandon their attempt to supervise executive implementation of
constitutional standards by defining those standards in great detail.
Instead, the courts should adopt their requirements in the form of
generally stated constitutional standards and should allow sufficient
executive flexibility to enable the states to design their im-
plementation.
It might be argued that such a "good faith" standard would be
meaningless and ineffectual and that only a detailed order and time-
table, implemented under judicial supervision and requiring strict
compliance regardless of the financial impact, would achieve the
desired results. This need not be so, however. If, for example, a
court were to decide that the Constitution requires "provision of
basic medical care to all patients in the institution," it could then
require the state to draft a plan indicating (1) what the state will do,
in the setting of the institution in question, to meet such a standard
and (2) how, and over what period of time, the state will implement
its plan. The court would retain the power to review and criticize
the state's particularization of the constitutional standard, but agree-
ment is likely due to widespread acceptance of what constitutes
minimally adequate care.400 -In fact, the court can avoid deciding
whether the precise ingredients of the plan amount to constitution-
405 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404 (1974) (footnotes omitted);
accord, Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2532, 2538
(1977).
406 See Note, supra note 22, at 1367.
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ally adequate care by treating the state's plan as provisional only. If
the plan makes major improvements in presently indefensible con-
ditions, the court need not bless that plan as constitutional. The
major issue is not what has to be done to complete the job-that is
a long way.off-but how the job can be begun. After the first steps
are taken, the plan can, and no doubt will, be altered as problems
arise in its implementation and as changes of judgment occur as to
the type of care needed. It is the direction and rate of change that
is important, not the details of timing, staffing, and planning for
capital construction. These details should not become the business
of the courts.
It is a mistake to assume that judicial power to ensure that the
states are implementing necessary changes as fast as they can derives
from the details of court orders or the extent of intervention in the
local democratic process. The fact that general cooperation with
the thrust of the court orders in the institution cases has occurred
to date 407 stems instead from the use of the courts' principal en-
forcement tool: their power publicly to make illegitimate the main-
tenance of intolerable conditions in the institutions. The power to
declare conditions unconstitutional is a potent weapon, as demon-
strated not only by the institution cases but also by those involving
Presidents 408 and Congress 409 as well. Indifference to the insti-
tutional conditions is made impossible by the judicial order, publicly
stated, that the outrageous conditions must be ended; its order that
action be taken arms the reform movement to achieve the desired
political result.410 Indeed, it is this kind of voluntary compliance
that the court seeks, not a confrontation with legislative or executive
power. But if the power of the courts rests principally on their
declaration that current conditions are illegitimate, they must take
care not to issue orders that make noncompliance excusable, and
thus legitimate. The likelihood of compliance is undermined, not
enhanced, by detailed orders that fail to recognize the constraints on
the political process. If the courts order the legislators and ex-
ecutives to do more than is possible, they invite understandable re-
sistance rather than compliance; that resistance invites further
407 See note 92 supra.
4o8 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
4o9 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
410 See Lucas, Of Ducs and Drakes: Judicial Relief in Reapportionment Cases,
38 NoTsus DumE LAw. 401, 413-14 (1963).
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orders, and the ensuing confrontation will lead not to better insti-
tutions but to political crisis.411
If the courts invite confrontation, they will face a practical
impediment to effectuating their orders more important than any
yet mentioned. These judicial orders are unenforceable. Only the
legislature can provide the necessary money, and only the executive
can administer the spending of that money.412 The courts cannot
imprison the legislature for contempt unless it raises or reallocates
the necessary money, nor jail an executive official to ensure imple-
mentation of a government program. Courts ultimately lack the
power to force state governments to act. Unless the courts are
willing to do what no responsible government official would do-
close the institutions, and let the prisoners and the mentally ill,
dangerous or otherwise, go free-if the courts are unwilling to play
a game of "chicken" with state officials, as they should be, they
should face the fact that these orders will be complied with, if at all,
voluntarily, absent federal executive action to enforce them. Recog-
nition of this practical limit on judicial power does not render the
courts powerless to enforce the Constitution. It merely restricts
them to their real, and not their imagined, power. "The Court's
authority-possessed of neither the purse nor the sword-ultimately
rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction." 413
An objection might be raised that the process I suggest will take
years, with the result that, in the meantime, constitutional rights will
continue to be violated by the states with impunity. Compliance
will indeed take time. But, as the Court recognized in the de-
segregation cases, although insistence on enforcement of constitu-
tional rights cannot be compromised, once the direction is set un-
411 One way courts avoid such confrontations is by issuing declaratory judg-
ments rather than injunctions against state officials. This approach has been encour-
aged in the name of federalism by the Supreme Court, see Doran v. Salem Inn,
Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975); Note, The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 Hnv.
L. Prav. 41, 211 nn.48-49 (1974); but the crux of the institution cases is not the
coercive nature of the relief but the intrusiveness involved in requiring legislative
and executive action. A requirement in the form of a declaratory judgment, rather
than an injunction, would only modestly lower the degree of confrontation.
412 See text accompanying notes 292-96 supra. Judicial attempts to appoint an
ombudsman or committee to manage the implementation of the judicial decrees
have been rejected by the Fifth Circuit as impermissible. Miller v. Carson, 563
F.2d 741, 752-54 (5th Cir. 1977); Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 288-90
(5th Cir. 1977).
413 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
"Such feeling must be nourished," he added, "by the Court's complete detachment,
in fact and in appearance, from political entanglements and by abstention from
injecting itself into the clash of political forces in political settlements." Id.
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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alterably, the achievement of that compliance may be slow. 14 Such
a compromise between the requirements of principle and the ex-
pediency which governs the political branches' efforts to achieve it
is not new; Alexander Bickel articulated it best when he described
what he called the "Lincolnian tension." 415 Lincoln, Bickel noted,
was opposed to slavery as a matter of principle but recognized the
limits a democratic society imposed on immediate achievement of
its abolition. The teaching of Lincoln's life, Bickel wrote,
is that principled government by the consent of the gov-
erned often means the definition of principled goals, and
the practice of the art of the possible in striving to attain
them. The hard fact of an existing evil institution such as
slavery and the hard practical difficulties that stood in the
way of its sudden abolition justified myriad compromises
short of abandoning the goal. The goal itself-the prin-
ciple-made sense only as an absolute, and as such it was
to be maintained. As such it had its vast educational value,
as such it exerted its crucial influence on the tendency of
prudential policy. But expedient compromises remained
necessary also, chiefly because a radically principled solu-
tion would collide with widespread prejudices, which no
government resting on consent could disregard, any more
than it could sacrifice its goals to them.4
16
That the immediate achievement of a constitutional goal is not
possible "is nothing to be proud of. It is a disagreeable fact, and
it cannot be wished away. It is no service to any worthy objective
simply to close one's eyes to it." 417 Thus the Court in the de-
segregation cases, like Lincoln on the issue of slavery, recognized the
practical difficulty of overturning resistance to the desired principle.
It therefore ordered not immediate compliance, but "all deliberate
speed."
Refraining from setting a judicially-imposed timetable, together
with a detailed minimum standard of facilities and care, will not be
easy. The conditions are unacceptable, the government process
slow, and the constitutional standards an urgent necessity. A quick
solution to the problem is almost irresistable. There is a human
inclination, to which judges are as susceptible as the rest of us, to
try to bypass the difficulties involved in the governmental process
414 See text accompanying notes 253-54 supra.
415 A. BioxnE, supra note 117, at 65.
416 Id. 68.
417 Id. 69.
1978]
794 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
and demand immediate action. But, as a dissenting judge in an
institution case said, "[a] Federal judge rearranging a State's penal
or educational system is like a man feeding candy to his grandchild.
He derives a great deal of personal satisfaction from it and has no
responsibility for the results." 418 Responsibility for government
action in a democracy can reside only in the political branches of
government.
But what if a state does nothing? What if it presents an in-
adequate plan or claims that present conditions are satisfactory?
What if the state claims that it would like to do more but has no
money to do so? If these questions suggest a lack of good faith
compliance-if the state is not trying to meet constitutional stand-
ards-the court is in no worse a position than if it had detailed
mandatory requirements that the state defied. The courts alone
cannot force state action; the federal legislative and executive
branches must do so. If Congress and the President must ever
resolve a conflict between federal judicial authority and the states,
the courts will be in a stronger position if their orders are moderate,
practical, and workable than if the states can claim that the courts
order more than is possible to do. Even if the courts do not under-
stand that money is a constraint, the Congress and the President
know that it is. Because Congress has the power to limit judicial
authority as well as the power to enforce the fourteenth amend-
ment,419 it is in the interest of the courts-and those who seek im-
provements in institutional conditions-to ensure that any con-
gressional decision defining judicial power is made with the courts
in their most defensible position. Because any confrontation be-
tween federal judicial power and state authority can be resolved
only by Congress, the judicial power of the purse will, in the final
analysis, extend no further than a democratic decision permits.
418 McRedmond v. Wilson, 533 F.2d 757, 766 (2d Cir. 1976) (Van Graafeiland,
J., dissenting).
419 See text accompanying notes 377-82 supra.
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